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The evolving design of RTO ancillary service markets

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  • Isemonger, Alan G.
Abstract
Although the markets for ancillary services at the North American Independent System Operators are often structured in quite different ways there is an emerging set of core design elements that represent a rough consensus as to what the optimal design configuration for ancillary services should be, albeit with some regional variation. This paper looks back at how the design of ancillary services markets has recently evolved to put this development in context. Thereafter it examines the methods by which ancillary services are procured by highlighting the procurement practices at a number of different Independent System Operators, principally those in California, New York, New England, Texas and the PJM Interconnection, in an attempt to tease out the remaining reasons why the ancillary service markets are still so different. This is important as there are many innovations that are not rooted in regional differences but reflect genuine technical advances and economic efficiency gains and can be replicated across other ISOs to produce more efficient designs, greater reliability and lower costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Isemonger, Alan G., 2009. "The evolving design of RTO ancillary service markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 150-157, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:37:y:2009:i:1:p:150-157
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cramton, Peter & Stoft, Steven, 2007. "Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 26-37.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Gonzalez Silva, Jean & Ferrari, Riccardo & van Wingerden, Jan-Willem, 2023. "Wind farm control for wake-loss compensation, thrust balancing and load-limiting of turbines," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 421-433.
    3. Viktorija Bobinaite & Artjoms Obushevs & Irina Oleinikova & Andrei Morch, 2018. "Economically Efficient Design of Market for System Services under the Web-of-Cells Architecture," Energies, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-29, March.
    4. Kumar, T. Bharath & Singh, Anoop, 2021. "Ancillary services in the Indian power sector – A look at recent developments and prospects," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    5. Michael G. Pollitt, 2011. "Lessons from the History of Independent System Operators in the Energy Sector, with applications to the Water Sector," Working Papers EPRG 1125, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    6. Pappachen, Abhijith & Peer Fathima, A., 2017. "Critical research areas on load frequency control issues in a deregulated power system: A state-of-the-art-of-review," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 163-177.
    7. Pollitt, Michael G., 2012. "Lessons from the history of independent system operators in the energy sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 32-48.
    8. Ming, Zeng & Ximei, Liu & Lilin, Peng, 2014. "The ancillary services in China: An overview and key issues," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 83-90.
    9. Wang, Peng & Zareipour, Hamidreza & Rosehart, William D., 2011. "Characteristics of the prices of operating reserves and regulation services in competitive electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 3210-3221, June.
    10. Prakash, Abhijith & Bruce, Anna & MacGill, Iain, 2022. "Insights on designing effective and efficient frequency control arrangements from the Australian National Electricity Market," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    11. Banshwar, Anuj & Sharma, Naveen Kumar & Sood, Yog Raj & Shrivastava, Rajnish, 2018. "An international experience of technical and economic aspects of ancillary services in deregulated power industry: Lessons for emerging BRIC electricity markets," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 774-801.
    12. Ilias G. Marneris & Pandelis N. Biskas & Anastasios G. Bakirtzis, 2017. "Stochastic and Deterministic Unit Commitment Considering Uncertainty and Variability Reserves for High Renewable Integration," Energies, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-25, January.

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