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Strategic capacity withholding through failures in the German-Austrian electricity market

Author

Listed:
  • Bergler, Julian
  • Heim, Sven
  • Hüschelrath, Kai
Abstract
In electricity day-ahead markets organized as uniform price auction, a small reduction in supply in times of high demand can cause substantial increases in price. We use a unique data set of failures of generation capacity in the German-Austrian electricity market to investigate the relationship between electricity spot prices and generation failures. Differentiating between strategic and non-strategic failures, we find a positive impact of prices on non-usable marginal generation capacity for strategic failures only. Our empirical analysis therefore provides evidence for the existence of strategic capacity withholding through failures suggesting further monitoring efforts by public authorities to effectively reduce the likelihood of such abuses of a dominant position.

Suggested Citation

  • Bergler, Julian & Heim, Sven & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2016. "Strategic capacity withholding through failures in the German-Austrian electricity market," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-009, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:16009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Duso, Tomaso & Szücs, Florian & Böckers, Veit, 2020. "Abuse of dominance and antitrust enforcement in the German electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    3. Bataille, Marc & Bodnar, Olivia & Steinmetz, Alexander & Thorwarth, Susanne, 2019. "Screening instruments for monitoring market power — The Return on Withholding Capacity Index (RWC)," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 227-237.
    4. Intini, Mario & Waterson, Michael, 2023. "Strategic behaviour by wind generators: An empirical investigation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    5. Pizarro-Irizar, Cristina, 2023. "Is it all about supply? Demand-side effects on the Spanish electricity market following Covid-19 lockdown policies," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    6. Leonardo Madio & Aldo Pignataro, 2022. "Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0295, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    7. Bo Sun & Siyuan Cheng & Jingdong Xie & Xin Sun, 2022. "Identification of Generators’ Economic Withholding Behavior Based on a SCAD-Logit Model in Electricity Spot Market," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-23, June.
    8. Valitov, Niyaz & Maier, Andreas, 2020. "Asymmetric information in the German intraday electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    9. N. M. Rozanova, 2021. "Methodological Issues of Modern Competition Policy," Studies on Russian Economic Development, Springer, vol. 32(5), pages 492-498, September.
    10. Bjørndal, Endre & Bjørndal, Mette Helene & Coniglio, Stefano & Körner, Marc-Fabian & Leinauer, Christina & Weibelzahl, Martin, 2023. "Energy storage operation and electricity market design: On the market power of monopolistic storage operators," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 307(2), pages 887-909.
    11. Leonardo Madio & Aldo Pignataro, 2022. "Collusion Sustainability with a Capacity Constrained Firm," CESifo Working Paper Series 10170, CESifo.
    12. Kenis, Michiel & Höschle, Hanspeter & Bruninx, Kenneth, 2022. "Strategic bidding of wind power producers in electricity markets in presence of information sharing," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    13. Bataille, Marc & Bodnar, Olivia & Steinmetz, Alexander & Thorwarth, Susanne, 2019. "Screening instruments for monitoring market power: The return on withholding capacity index (RWC)," DICE Discussion Papers 311, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    14. Karol Tucki & Olga Orynycz & Andrzej Wasiak & Antoni Świć & Wojciech Dybaś, 2019. "Capacity Market Implementation in Poland: Analysis of a Survey on Consequences for the Electricity Market and for Energy Management," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(5), pages 1-16, March.
    15. Durmaz, Tunç & Acar, Sevil & Kızılkaya, Simay, 2024. "Generation failures, strategic withholding, and capacity payments in the Turkish electricity market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust Policy; Market Power; Auctions; Electricity; Withholding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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