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An extension of the [tau]-value to games with coalition structures

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  • Casas-Mendez, Balbina
  • Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio
  • van den Nouweland, Anne
  • Vazquez-Brage, Margarita
Abstract
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Suggested Citation

  • Casas-Mendez, Balbina & Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio & van den Nouweland, Anne & Vazquez-Brage, Margarita, 2003. "An extension of the [tau]-value to games with coalition structures," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 494-513, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:148:y:2003:i:3:p:494-513
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tijs, S.H. & Otten, G.J.M., 1993. "Compromise values in cooperative game theory," Research Memorandum FEW 615, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Tijs, S.H. & Driessen, T.S.H., 1986. "Game theory and cost allocation problems," Other publications TiSEM 376c24c5-c95d-4d29-96b6-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Tijs, S.H. & Lipperts, F.A.S., 1982. "The hypercube and the core cover of N-person cooperative games," Other publications TiSEM f86cf523-f36d-4652-b774-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Tijs, S.H. & Otten, G.J.M., 1993. "Compromise values in cooperative game theory," Other publications TiSEM 0f7c6f08-1cec-4b83-942a-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. M. Angeles de Frutos, 1999. "Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(3), pages 255-272.
    6. S.C. Littlechild & G.F. Thompson, 1977. "Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 186-204, Spring.
    7. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
    8. Tijs, S.H. & Otten, G.J.M., 1993. "Compromise values in cooperative game theory," Other publications TiSEM 59116a16-eeef-4571-9c8d-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. S. H. Tijs & T. S. H. Driessen, 1986. "Game Theory and Cost Allocation Problems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(8), pages 1015-1028, August.
    10. Tijs, Stef H., 1987. "An axiomatization of the [tau]-value," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 177-181, April.
    11. Driessen, T. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "The core and the ô -value for cooperative games with coalition structures," Other publications TiSEM 5f84b31f-7d79-4f81-a55d-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Stef Tijs & Gert-Jan Otten, 1993. "Compromise values in cooperative game theory," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 1(1), pages 1-36, December.
    13. Vazquez-Brage, M. & van den Nouweland, A. & Garcia-Jurado, I., 1997. "Owen's coalitional value and aircraft landing fees," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 273-286, October.
    14. Pradeep Dubey, 1982. "The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees--Revisited," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(8), pages 869-874, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guang Zhang & Erfang Shan & Liying Kang & Yanxia Dong, 2017. "Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on $$\tau $$ τ -values," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 462-482, August.
    2. Csóka Péter & Pintér Miklós, 2016. "On the Impossibility of Fair Risk Allocation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 143-158, January.
    3. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Pere Timoner Lledó, 2016. "Decentralized rationing problems," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2016/345, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Peter Borm & Luisa Carpente & Balbina Casas-Méndez & Ruud Hendrickx, 2005. "The Constrained Equal Awards Rule for Bankruptcy Problems with a Priori Unions," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 211-227, July.
    5. Beard, Rodney & McDonald, Stuart, 2005. "Dynamic Recontracting of Water Rights," 2005 Conference (49th), February 9-11, 2005, Coff's Harbour, Australia 137781, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    6. Shan, Erfang & Zhang, Guang & Dong, Yanxia, 2016. "Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 22-28.
    7. Péter Csóka & P. Herings & László Kóczy, 2011. "Balancedness conditions for exact games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 74(1), pages 41-52, August.
    8. Gómez-Rodríguez, Marcos & Davila-Pena, Laura & Casas-Méndez, Balbina, 2024. "Cost allocation problems on highways with grouped users," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 316(2), pages 667-679.
    9. Keyzer, Michiel & van Wesenbeeck, Cornelia, 2011. "Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: Two sides of one coin," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(3), pages 604-615, December.
    10. Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2010. "The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(2), pages 795-806, December.
    11. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 818-849, May.
    12. Kai Zhang & Haishu Lu & Bin Wang, 2024. "Benefit Distribution Mechanism of a Cooperative Alliance for Basin Water Resources from the Perspective of Cooperative Game Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(16), pages 1-33, August.
    13. Csóka, Péter & Jean-Jacques Herings, P. & Kóczy, László Á. & Pintér, Miklós, 2011. "Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 209(1), pages 57-62, February.
    14. Rong Zou & Wenzhong Li & Marc Uetz & Genjiu Xu, 2023. "Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, March.
    15. J. M. Alonso-Meijide & J. Costa & I. García-Jurado & J. C. Gonçalves-Dosantos, 2020. "On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 28(3), pages 672-688, October.

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