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The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go

Author

Listed:
  • Achim Hagen

    (Resource Economics Group, Humboldt Universiät zu Berlin, 10117 Berlin, Germany)

  • Pierre von Mouche

    (Section Economics, Wageningen University, 6708 PB Wageningen, The Netherlands)

  • Hans-Peter Weikard

    (Section Economics, Wageningen University, 6708 PB Wageningen, The Netherlands)

Abstract
Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where actions are simultaneous in each stage. Herein, we give special attention to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As they are crucial, recent results on the uniqueness of coalitional equilibria of Cournot-like physical games are reconsidered. Various concrete examples are included. Finally, we discuss research strategies to obtain results about equilibrium coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives.

Suggested Citation

  • Achim Hagen & Pierre von Mouche & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2020. "The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:11:y:2020:i:1:p:3-:d:303936
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    References listed on IDEAS

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