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River Sharing and Water Trade

Author

Listed:
  • Erik Ansink

    (Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), VU University Amsterdam)

  • Michael Gengenbach

    (Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University)

  • Hans-Peter Weikard

    (Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University)

Abstract
We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water, with the possibility that other agents take some of the river water that passes their territory.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Ansink & Michael Gengenbach & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2012. "River Sharing and Water Trade," Working Papers 2012.17, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.17
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Grundel, S., 2015. "Essays on cooperation in resource allocation and scheduling," Other publications TiSEM c2d78915-6b6f-4f8b-b601-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Maryam Jafroudi, 2018. "Enhancing climate resilience of transboundary water allocation agreements: the impact of shortening the agreement’s lifetime on cooperation stability," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 707-722, October.
    3. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2015. "Composition properties in the river claims problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 807-831, April.
    4. Nadine Wittmann, 2014. "A Microeconomic Perspective on Water Resources Management: Analyzing the Effects on Optimal Land Rents Along a River Basin," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(5), pages 1309-1325, March.
    5. Nadine Wittmann, 2014. "A Note on Distortional Distributional Effects in River Basin Discharge Permit Trade," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(1), pages 279-285, January.
    6. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2014. "The Economics of Transboundary River Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-132/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Kong, Wen & Knapp, Keith C., 2014. "Economic and Political Equilibrium for a Renewable Natural Resource with International Trade," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 170591, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    River Sharing; Water Trade; Market Emergence; Property Rights; Coalition Stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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