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Attribute Coordination in Organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Yingyi Qian

    (Department of Economics, University of Maryland)

  • Gerard Roland

    (UC-Berkeley and ECARE (Universit¡äe Libre de Bruxelles))

  • Chenggang Xu

    (Department of Economics, London School of Economics)

Abstract
We study coordination in organizations with a variety of organizational forms. Coordination in organization is modeled as the adjustment of attributes and capacities of tasks when facing external shocks. An M-form (U-form) organization groups complementary (substitutable) tasks together in one unit. In the presence of only attribute shocks, particularly when gains from specialization are small, communication is poor, or shocks are more likely, the expected payoff of the decentralized M-form is the highest. When facing both types of shocks, centralization does better if communication is good. The implications of organizational forms for the patterns of innovations and reforms within an organization, particularly centralized versus decentralized experiments and top-down versus bottom-up reforms, are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Chenggang Xu, 2001. "Attribute Coordination in Organizations," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 2(2), pages 487-518, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2001:v:2:i:2:p:487-518
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Organization forms; Coordination; M-form; U-form;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P40 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - General
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General
    • L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General

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