Free to Choose: Promoting Conservation by Relaxing Outdoor Watering Restrictions

Anita Castledine, Klaus Moeltner, Michael Price and Shawn Stoddard

No 20362, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Many water utilities use outdoor watering restrictions based on assigned weekly watering days to promote conservation and delay costly capacity expansions. We find that such policies can lead to unintended consequences - customers who adhere to the prescribed schedule use more water than those following a more flexible irrigation pattern. For our application to residential watering in a high-desert environment, this "rigidity penalty" is robust to an exogenous policy change that allowed an additional watering day per week. Our findings contribute to the growing literature on leakage effects of regulatory policies. In our case inefficiencies arise as policies limit the extent to which agents can temporally re-allocate actions.

JEL-codes: C11 C30 Q2 Q25 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
Note: EEE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published as Castledine, A. & Moeltner, K. & Price, M.K. & Stoddard, S., 2014. "Free to choose: Promoting conservation by relaxing outdoor watering restrictions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 324-343.

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