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The Performance of Elected Officials: Evidence from State Supreme Courts. (2016). Macleod, W. Bentley ; Ash, Elliott.
In: NBER Working Papers.
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22071.

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  47. Tennessee moved from partisan to merit-uncontested in 1972, then moved back to partisan elections in 1975. It is not included in the analysis.
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  48. The Maryland governor began selecting new appointees by merit commission beginning in 1971. When it moved from non-partisan retention to uncontested retention, the term length was reduced from 15 years to 10 years. Oklahoma instituted an intermediate appellate court at the same time it moved from partisan to merit-uncontested.
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  49. Utah instituted an intermediate appellate court in 1988, two years after the reform from non-partisan to merit-uncontested. B.2 Additional Regression Results This appendix reports additional empirical results.
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