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Antitrust. (2007). Shapiro, Carl ; Kaplow, Louis.
In: Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series.
RePEc:cdl:compol:qt9pt7p9bm.

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    In: Economic Policy.
    RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1842.

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  2. Market Share Exclusion. (2011). Packalen, Mikko.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wat:wpaper:1103.

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  3. Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement. (2007). Pittman, Russell.
    In: EAG Discussions Papers.
    RePEc:doj:eagpap:200709.

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