A Two-Country Model of Renewable Resource Sharing

No 41, Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers from CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal

Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the sustainability of optimal cooperative policies for the replenishment of a renewable resource shared by two countries. If the development of these nations constitutes a threat to the common stock, under what conditions can a social best (a Pareto optimum) be sustainable? The question is addressed within a two-country neo-classical growth model with externality. In the worst scenario, the poorer country leaves the replenishment burden to the rich. International transfers are then non-existent. Nevertheless, in absence of a commitment mechanism, it is still possible to reach a social best provided the countries' patience, expressed by their discount factor, is high enough. The strategies that implement these Pareto optima are self-enforcing trigger-strategies that involve positive transfers of wealth between countries and a threat to autarky in case of defection. Sustainable Pareto optima are then identified in a specific case of environmental resource (clean air) and for a calibration of the model economies to the United States and a country five times poorer. An estimate of the transfers required to implement these social optima is provided.

Keywords: Renewable resources; pollution; neo-classical growth model; sustainable Pareto optima (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 E13 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1996-05
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Journal Article: On the Enforcement of Cooperative Environmental Policies (2000)
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