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The Affiliate Matching Problem: On Labor Markets where Firms are Also Interested in the Placement of Previous Workers. (2020). Dickerson, John P ; Dooley, Samuel.
In: Papers.
RePEc:arx:papers:2009.11867.

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Cocites

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  2. Dress to Impress: Brands as Status Symbols. (2011). Rodrigues-Neto, José ; Mazali, Rogério.
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  3. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. (2010). Klaus, Bettina ; Haake, Claus-Jochen.
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  4. Marktdesign und Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung. (2009). Ockenfels, Axel.
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  5. Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets. (2008). Boudreau, James.
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  6. Constrained School Choice. (2008). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
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  7. Marriage Matching with Correlated Preferences. (2007). Knoblauch, Vicki ; Celik, Onur.
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  8. What`s the Matter with Tie-breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice. (2007). Erdil, Aytek ; Ergin, Haluk.
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  9. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
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  11. Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts. (2006). Niederle, Muriel.
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  12. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
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