Matching and Price Competition

Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin

No 11506, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implying little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust case against the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results.

JEL-codes: D44 J41 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-08
Note: IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Bulow, Jeremy and Jonathan Levin. "Matching And Price Competition," American Economic Review, 2006, v96(3,Jun), 652-668.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Matching and Price Competition (2006)
Working Paper: Matching and Price Competition (2004)
Working Paper: Matching and Price Competition (2003)
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