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Your smartphone holds a lot of your personal information to help you get things done every day. On Android, we are seamlessly integrating the latest artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, like Gemini as a trusted assistant – capable of handling life's essential tasks. As such, ensuring your privacy and security on Android is paramount. As a pioneer in responsible AI and cutting-edge privacy technologies like Private Compute Core and federated learning, we made sure our approach to the assistant experience with Gemini on Android is aligned with our existing Secure AI framework, AI Principles and Privacy Principles.

We’ve always safeguarded your data with an integrated stack of world-class secure infrastructure and technology, delivering end-to-end protection in a way that only Google can. From privacy on-device when handling sensitive data to the world’s best cloud infrastructure, here are six key ways we keep your information private and protected.

  • We don’t hand off to a third-party AI provider.

    Gemini Apps can help you with complex, personal tasks from creating workout routines to helping you get started on a resume. And it does the hard work for you all within Google's ecosystem. The core processing is done by Gemini within Google's secure cloud infrastructure and there are no handoffs to third-party chatbots or AI providers that you may not know or trust.

  • On-device AI privacy for sensitive tasks, even when offline.

    For some AI features, like Summarize in Recorder on Pixel, that benefit from additional data privacy or processing efficiency, we utilize on-device AI. Gemini Nano, the first multimodal model designed to run on mobile devices, delivers on-device AI processing for some of your most sensitive tasks without relying on cloud connectivity. You can enjoy features like summarizing text even when you’re offline.

  • World-class cloud infrastructure that is secure by default, private by design.

    For AI tasks that use data already in the cloud or have complex demands that require more processing power than what’s possible on-device, we use Google’s highly secure cloud infrastructure. Backed by Google’s world-class security and privacy infrastructure and processes, these data centers benefit from the same robust defenses that have kept Google products safe for billions of users for more than 20 years. So you can ask Gemini to find details in your lease agreement saved in your Google Drive and that data is protected by advanced monitoring against unauthorized access or misuse. We also enforce strict software supply chain controls to ensure that only approved and verified code runs in our cloud environment.

  • Control how you interact with Gemini Apps.

    We've designed the Gemini Apps experience with careful consideration for how you access it and control it. You can review and choose the Gemini experiences you want – when and where they’re needed most. And at any time, you can review your Gemini Apps chats, pin them, or delete them. Android also gives you control over how apps such as Gemini respond when your device is locked.

  • Pioneering new privacy technologies.

    We’re always working to develop new ways to keep your data even more private and secure. We continue to innovate in advancing privacy-preserving technologies, like sealed computing technology, which can be used to process sensitive workloads for enhanced privacy in a secure cloud enclave. Sealed computing ensures no one, including Google, can access the data. It can be thought of as extending the user’s device and its security boundaries into our cloud infrastructure, providing a virtual smartphone in the sky.

  • A new level of transparency.

    Transparency is in Android’s open-source DNA. Android binary transparency already allows anyone to verify the operating system code against a transparency log to ensure it hasn't been tampered with, much like matching fingerprint biometrics to confirm someone's identity. Binary transparency is extended in sealed computing environments to include reproducible builds. This ensures anyone can rebuild the trusted firmware base and verify that the resulting binaries match what is remotely attested as running in production and published in public transparency logs.

Our Commitment to Safeguarding Your DataJust like with all Google products, we believe you should be able to enjoy the benefits of Android without having to worry about security and privacy. That's why we invest so much in building world-class protections into our products and services from the start. We look forward to continuing to make AI helpful and intuitive, allowing you to focus on what matters most, while we take care of safeguarding your data.

Keep a lookout for more information about our end-to-end approach to AI privacy in an upcoming whitepaper.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) just released three finalized standards for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) covering public key encapsulation and two forms of digital signatures. In progress since 2016, this achievement represents a major milestone towards standards development that will keep information on the Internet secure and confidential for many years to come.

Here's a brief overview of what PQC is, how Google is using PQC, and how other organizations can adopt these new standards. You can also read more about PQC and Google's role in the standardization process in this 2022 post from Cloud CISO Phil Venables.

What is PQC?

Encryption is central to keeping information confidential and secure on the Internet. Today, most Internet sessions in modern browsers are encrypted to prevent anyone from eavesdropping or altering the data in transit. Digital signatures are also crucial to online trust, from code signing proving that programs haven't been tampered with, to signals that can be relied on for confirming online identity.

Modern encryption technologies are secure because the computing power required to "crack the code" is very large; larger than any computer in existence today or the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, that's an advantage that won't last forever. Practical large-scale quantum computers are still years away, but computer scientists have known for decades that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) could break existing forms of asymmetric key cryptography.

PQC is the effort to defend against that risk, by defining standards and collaboratively implementing new algorithms that will resist attacks by both classical and quantum computers.

You don't need a quantum computer to use post-quantum cryptography, or to prepare. All of the standards released by NIST today run on the classical computers we currently use.

How is encryption at risk?

While a CRQC doesn't exist yet, devices and data from today will still be relevant in future. Some risks are already here:

  • Stored Data Through an attack known as Store Now, Decrypt Later, encrypted data captured and saved by attackers is stored for later decryption, with the help of as-yet unbuilt quantum computers
  • Hardware Products Defenders must ensure that future attackers cannot forge a digital signature and implant compromised firmware, or software updates, on pre-quantum devices that are still in use

For more information on CRQC-related risks, see our PQC Threat Model post.

How can organizations prepare for PQC migrations?

Migrating to new cryptographic algorithms is often a slow process, even when weaknesses affect widely-used crypto systems, because of organizational and logistical challenges in fully completing the transition to new technologies. For example, NIST deprecated SHA-1 hashing algorithms in 2011 and recommends complete phase-out by 2030.

That’s why it's crucial to take steps now to improve organizational preparedness, independent of PQC, with the goal of making your transition to PQC easier.

These crypto agility best practices can be enacted anytime:

  • Cryptographic inventory Understanding where and how organizations are using cryptography includes knowing what cryptographic algorithms are in use, and critically, managing key material safely and securely
  • Key rotation Any new cryptographic system will require the ability to generate new keys and move them to production without causing outages. Just like testing recovery from backups, regularly testing key rotation should be part of any good resilience plan
  • Abstraction layers You can use a tool like Tink, Google's multi-language, cross-platform open source library, designed to make it easy for non-specialists to use cryptography safely, and to switch between cryptographic algorithms without extensive code refactoring
  • End-to-end testing PQC algorithms have different properties. Notably, public keys, ciphertexts, and signatures are significantly larger. Ensure that all layers of the stack function as expected

Our 2022 paper "Transitioning organizations to post-quantum cryptography" provides additional recommendations to help organizations prepare and this recent post from the Google Security Blog has more detail on cryptographic agility and key rotation.

Google's PQC Commitments

Google takes these risks seriously, and is taking steps on multiple fronts. Google began testing PQC in Chrome in 2016 and has been using PQC to protect internal communications since 2022. In May 2024, Chrome enabled ML-KEM by default for TLS 1.3 and QUIC on desktop. ML-KEM is also enabled on Google servers. Connections between Chrome Desktop and Google's products, such as Cloud Console or Gmail, are already experimentally protected with post-quantum key exchange.

Google engineers have contributed to the standards released by NIST, as well as standards created by ISO, and have submitted Internet Drafts to the IETF for Trust Expressions, Merkle Tree Certificates, and managing state for hash-based signatures. Tink, Google's open source library that provides secure and easy-to-use cryptographic APIs, already provides experimental PQC algorithms in C++, and our engineers are working with partners to produce formally verified PQC implementations that can be used at Google, and beyond.

As we make progress on our own PQC transition, Google will continue to provide PQC updates on Google services, with updates to come from Android, Chrome, Cloud, and others.

Cell-site simulators, also known as False Base Stations (FBS) or Stingrays, are radio devices that mimic real cell sites in order to lure mobile devices to connect to them. These devices are commonly used for security and privacy attacks, such as surveillance and interception of communications. In recent years, carriers have started reporting new types of abuse perpetrated with FBSs for the purposes of financial fraud.

In particular, there is increasingly more evidence of the exploitation of weaknesses in cellular communication standards leveraging cell-site simulators to inject SMS phishing messages directly into smartphones. This method to inject messages entirely bypasses the carrier network, thus bypassing all the sophisticated network-based anti-spam and anti-fraud filters. Instances of this new type of fraud, which carriers refer to as SMS Blaster fraud, have been reported in Vietnam, France, Norway, Thailand and multiple other countries.

GSMA’s Fraud and Security Group (FASG) has developed a briefing paper for GSMA members to raise awareness of SMS Blaster fraud and provide guidelines and mitigation recommendations for carriers, OEMs and other stakeholders. The briefing paper, available for GSMA members only, calls out some Android-specific recommendations and features that can help effectively protect our users from this new type of fraud.

What are SMS Blasters?

SMS Blaster is the term that global carriers use to refer to FBS and cell-site simulators operated unlawfully with the goal of disseminating (blast) SMS payloads. The most common use case is to leverage these devices to inject Smishing (SMS phishing) payloads into user devices. Fraudsters typically do this by driving around with portable FBS devices, and there have even been reports of fraudsters carrying these devices in their backpacks.

The method is straightforward and replicates known techniques to trick mobile devices to an attacker-controlled 2G network. SMS Blasters expose a fake LTE or 5G network which executes a single function: downgrading the user’s connection to a legacy 2G protocol. The same device also exposes a fake 2G network, which lures all the devices to connect to it. At this point, attackers abuse the well known lack of mutual authentication in 2G and force connections to be unencrypted, which enables a complete Person-in-the-Middle (PitM) position to inject SMS payloads.

SMS Blasters are sold on the internet and do not require deep technical expertise. They are simple to set up and ready to operate, and users can easily configure them to imitate a particular carrier or network using a mobile app. Users can also easily configure and customize the SMS payload as well as its metadata, including for example the sender number.

SMS Blasters are very appealing to fraudsters given their great return on investment. Spreading SMS phishing messages commonly yields a small return as it is very difficult to get these messages to fly undetected by sophisticated anti-spam filters. A very small subset of messages eventually reach a victim. In contrast, injecting messages with an SMS blaster entirely bypasses the carrier network and its anti-fraud and anti-spam filters, guaranteeing that all messages will reach a victim. Moreover, using an FBS the fraudster can control all fields of the message. One can make the message look like it is coming from the legitimate SMS aggregator of a bank, for example. In a recent attack that impacted hundreds of thousands of devices, the messages masqueraded as a health insurance notice.

Although the type of abuse carriers are uncovering recently is financial fraud, there is precedent for the use of rogue cellular base stations to disseminate malware, for example injecting phishing messages with a url to download the payload. It is important to note that users are still vulnerable to this type of fraud as long as mobile devices support 2G, regardless of the status of 2G in their local carrier.

Android protects users from phishing and fraud

There are a number of Android-only security features that can significantly mitigate, or in some cases fully block, the impact of this type of fraud.

Android 12 introduced a user option to disable 2G at the modem level, a feature first adopted by Pixel. This option, if used, completely mitigates the risk from SMS Blasters. This feature has been available since Android 12 and requires devices to conform to Radio HAL 1.6+.

Android also has an option to disable null ciphers as a key protection because it is strictly necessary for the 2G FBS to configure a null cipher (e.g. A5/0) in order to inject an SMS payload. This security feature launched with Android 14 requires devices that implement radio HAL 2.0 or above.

Android also provides effective protections that specifically tackles SMS spam and phishing, regardless of whether the delivery channel is an SMS Blaster. Android has built-in spam protection that helps to identify and block spam SMS messages. Additional protection is provided through RCS for Business, a feature that helps users identify legitimate SMS messages from businesses. RCS for Business messages are marked with a blue checkmark, which indicates that the message has been verified by Google.

We advocate leveraging a couple of important Google security features which are available on Android, namely Safe Browsing and Google Play Protect. As an additional layer of protection, Safe Browsing built-in on Android devices protects 5 billion devices globally and helps warn the users about potentially risky sites, downloads and extensions which could be phishing and malware-based.

Let’s say a user decides to download an app from the Play store but the app contains code that is malicious or harmful, users are protected by Google Play Protect which is a security feature that scans apps for malware and other threats. It also warns users about potentially harmful apps before they are installed.

Android’s commitment to security and privacy

Android is committed to providing users with a safe and secure mobile experience. We are constantly working to improve our security features and protect users from phishing, fraud, and other threats.

Working with global carriers and other OEMs through the GSMA to support the ecosystem in the development and adoption of further cellular security and privacy features is a priority area for Android. We look forward to partnering with ecosystem partners in further raising the security bar in this space to protect mobile users from threats like SMS blasters.

Thank you to all our colleagues who actively contribute to Android’s efforts in tackling fraud and FBS threats, and special thanks to those who contributed to this blog post: Yomna Nasser, Gil Cukierman, Il-Sung Lee, Eugene Liderman, Siddarth Pandit.