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Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for Good Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • A. Mitchell Polinsky

    (Stanford University)

Abstract
In this article I examine the social desirability of rewarding prisoners for good behavior, either by reducing their sentences (granting "time off"), converting part of their sentences to a period of parole, or providing them with privileges in prison. Rewarding good behavior reduces the state’s cost of operating prisons. But rewarding good behavior also tends to lower the deterrence of crime because such rewards diminish the disutility of imprisonment. I demonstrate that, despite this countervailing consideration, it is always socially desirable to reward good behavior with either time off or parole. In essence, this is because the reward can be chosen so that it just offsets the burden borne by prisoners to meet the standard of good behavior — resulting in good behavior essentially without a reduction in deterrence. While employing privileges to reward good behavior might be preferable to no reward, the use of privileges is inferior to time off and parole.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2015. "Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for Good Behavior," Discussion Papers 15-023, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:sip:dpaper:15-023
    as

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    File URL: http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/15-023.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Schmitt & Kris Warner & Sarika Gupta, 2010. "The High Budgetary Cost of Incarceration," CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs 2010-14, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).
    2. Fabel, Oliver & Meier, Volker, 1999. "Optimal parole decisions," Munich Reprints in Economics 20546, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Ilyana Kuziemko, 2013. "How should inmates be released from prison? An assessment of parole versus fixed-sentence regimes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(1), pages 371-424.
    4. Dan Bernhardt & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2012. "Rehabilitated or Not: An Informational Theory of Parole Decisions," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 186-210.
    5. Fabel, Oliver & Meier, Volker, 1999. "Optimal parole decisions1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 159-166, June.
    6. Lewis, Donald E., 1979. "The optimal parole period," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 381-386.
    7. Jesse M. Shapiro, 2007. "Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Recidivism? A Discontinuity-based Approach," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2019. "Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment," NBER Working Papers 26083, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Paul N. Riskind, 2017. "Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation," NBER Working Papers 23436, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Pyne, Derek, 2015. "Can early release both reduce prison costs and increase deterrence?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 69-71.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    imprisonment; parole; prison costs; prisoner behavior; deterrence; sanctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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