Repeated moral hazard with costly self-control
Author
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2006.
"Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(3), pages 689-714.
- Spiegler, Ran & Eliaz, Kfir, 2004. "Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 4573, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2004. "Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000530, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001.
"Temptation and Self-Control,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November.
- W. Pesendorfer & F. Gul, 1999. "Temptation and Self-Control," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f1, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Paul Heidhues & Botond Koszegi, 2010. "Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2279-2303, December.
- Bezalel Peleg & Menahem E. Yaari, 1973. "On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(3), pages 391-401.
- Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Macho, Ines & Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1994.
"Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 1527-1553, October.
- Chiappori, P.A. & Macho, I. & Rey, P. & Salanié, B., 1989. "Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Access to Credit Markets," DELTA Working Papers 89-18, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Chiappori, P.A. & Macho, I. & Rey, p. & Salanie, B., 1994. "Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Acces to Credit Markets," Papers 06, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
- Yılmaz, Murat, 2013. "Repeated moral hazard with a time-inconsistent agent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 70-89.
- Noor, Jawwad, 2007.
"Commitment and self-control,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 1-34, July.
- Jawwad Noor, 2005. "Commitment and Self-Control," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-014, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Jawwad Noor, 2005. "Commitment and Self-Control," Microeconomics 0509008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- E. S. Phelps & R. A. Pollak, 1968. "On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 35(2), pages 185-199.
- Łukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2015. "Time consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumers," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 83-112, February.
- Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 2006. "The recursive approach to time inconsistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 134-156, November.
- Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
- Gilpatric, Scott M., 2008. "Present-biased preferences, self-awareness and shirking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 735-754, September.
- Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
- David Laibson, 1997.
"Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
- Laibson, David I., 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," Scholarly Articles 4481499, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Wojciech Olszewski, 2011. "A model of consumption-dependent temptation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(1), pages 83-93, January.
- Esteban, Susanna & Miyagawa, Eiichi, 2006. "Temptation, self-control, and competitive nonlinear pricing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 348-355, March.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Woźny, Łukasz, 2015. "On incentives, temptation and self-control," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 60-67.
- Lukasz Wozny & Michal Krawczyk, 2016. "An experiment on temptation and attitude towards paternalism," KAE Working Papers 2016-018, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis.
- Balbus, Łukasz & Reffett, Kevin & Woźny, Łukasz, 2022.
"Time-consistent equilibria in dynamic models with recursive payoffs and behavioral discounting,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Lukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Lukasz Wozny, 2020. "Time consistent equilibria in dynamic models with recursivepayoffs and behavioral discounting," KAE Working Papers 2020-055, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis.
- Yılmaz, Murat, 2015. "Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: To exploit or not to exploit?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 46-51.
- Yılmaz, Murat, 2013. "Repeated moral hazard with a time-inconsistent agent," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 70-89.
- Méder, Zsombor Z. & Flesch, János & Peeters, Ronald, 2017.
"Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 40-54.
- Méder, Z.Z. & Flesch, J. & Peeters, R.J.A.P., 2014. "Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Laureti, Carolina & Szafarz, Ariane, 2023.
"Banking regulation and costless commitment contracts for time-inconsistent agents,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
- Carolina Laureti & Ariane Szafarz, 2023. "Banking Regulation and Costless Commitment Contracts for Time-Inconsistent Agents," Working Papers CEB 23-010, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Lilia Maliar & Serguei Maliar, 2016. "Ruling Out Multiplicity of Smooth Equilibria in Dynamic Games: A Hyperbolic Discounting Example," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 243-261, June.
- Yu, Pei Cheng, 2020.
"Seemingly exploitative contracts,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 299-320.
- Pei-Cheng Yu, 2018. "Seemingly Exploitative Contracts," Discussion Papers 2018-15, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2019. "Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting: Moral Hazard and Dynamic Inconsistency," Working Papers 2019-17, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Murat Yilmaz, 2018. "An Extended Survey of Time-Inconsistency and Its Applications," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 32(1), pages 55-73.
- Minwook Kang, 2019. "Pareto-improving tax policies under hyperbolic discounting," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 618-660, June.
- Florian Englmaier & Matthias Fahn & Marco A. Schwarz, 2016.
"Long-Term Employment Relations when Agents are Present Biased,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
6159, CESifo.
- Englmaier, Florian & Fahn, Matthias & Schwarz, Marco, 2018. "Long-Term Employment Relations When Agents are Present Biased," CEPR Discussion Papers 13227, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fahn, Matthias & Schwarz, Marco A., 2017. "Long-Term Employment Relations when Agents Are Present Biased," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 6, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Mihm, Maximilian & Ozbek, Kemal, 2019. "On the identification of changing tastes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 203-216.
- Fahn, Matthias & Seibel, Regina, 2022.
"Present bias in the labor market – when it pays to be naive,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 144-167.
- Matthias Fahn & Regina Seibel, 2022. "Present Bias in the Labor Market--When it Pays to be Naive," Economics working papers 2022-04, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Mihm, Maximilian & Ozbek, Kemal, 2018. "Mood-driven choices and self-regulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 727-760.
- David S. Ahn & Ryota Iijima & Yves Le Yaouanq & Todd Sarver, 2017.
"Behavioral Characterizations of Naivet� for Time-Inconsistent Preferences,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
2074, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- David S. Ahn & Ryota Iijima & Yves Le Yaouanq & Todd Sarver, 2017. "Behavioral Characterizations of Naivet� for Time-Inconsistent Preferences," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2074R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2018.
- Basu, Karna, 2014. "Commitment savings in informal banking markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 97-111.
- Weinschenk, Philipp, 2021. "On the benefits of time-inconsistent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 185-195.
- Bryan, Gharad & Karlan, Dean & Nelson, Scott, 2009.
"Commitment Contracts,"
Working Papers
73, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Gharad Bryan & Dean Karlan & Scott Nelson, 2009. "Commitment Contracts," Working Papers 980, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Bryan, Gharad & Karlan, Dean S. & Nelson, Scott, 2009. "Commitment Contracts," Center Discussion Papers 54536, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
More about this item
Keywords
repeated moral hazard; self-control costs; temptation; principal-agent; optimal contract;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HRM-2016-10-23 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2016-10-23 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sgh:kaewps:2016017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Dariusz Nojszewski (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/kawawpl.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.