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Can creditor bail-in trigger contagion? The experience of an emerging market

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  • Roy Havemann
Abstract
The successful bail-in of creditors in African Bank, a small South African monoline lender, provides an opportunity to evaluate the intended and unintended consequences of new resolution tools. Using a data set that matches quarterly, daily and nancial-instrument level data, I show that the bail-in led to money-market funds `breaking the buck’, triggering signi cant […]

Suggested Citation

  • Roy Havemann, 2018. "Can creditor bail-in trigger contagion? The experience of an emerging market," Working Papers 755, Economic Research Southern Africa.
    • Handle: RePEc:rza:wpaper:755
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    capital market; central bank; Monetary Policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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