monetary authority operating under discretion. Firms have the option to increase their frequency> of price change, at a cost, in response to higher inflation. Previous studies, which assume a constant> degree of price rigidity across inflation regimes, find two time consistent equilibria ? one with low> inflation, the other with high inflation. In contrast, when price rigidity is endogenous, the high> inflation equilibrium ceases to exist. Hence, time consistent equilibrium is unique. This result> depends on two features of the analysis: (1) a plausible quantitative specification of the fixed cost> of price change, and (2) the presence of an arbitrarily small cost of inflation that is independent of> price rigidity.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)"> monetary authority operating under discretion. Firms have the option to increase their frequency> of price change, at a cost, in response to higher inflation. Previous studies, which assume a constant> degree of price rigidity across inflation regimes, find two time consistent equilibria ? one with low> inflation, the other with high inflation. In contrast, when price rigidity is endogenous, the high> inflation equilibrium ceases to exist. Hence, time consistent equilibrium is unique. This result> depends on two features of the analysis: (1) a plausible quantitative specification of the fixed cost> of price change, and (2) the presence of an arbitrarily small cost of inflation that is independent of> price rigidity.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)"> monetary authority operating under discretion. Firms have the option to increase their frequency> of pri">
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Time Consistent Monetary Policy with Endogenous Price Rigidity

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  • Henry Siu
Abstract
I characterize time consistent equilibrium in an economy with price rigidity and an optimizing> monetary authority operating under discretion. Firms have the option to increase their frequency> of price change, at a cost, in response to higher inflation. Previous studies, which assume a constant> degree of price rigidity across inflation regimes, find two time consistent equilibria ? one with low> inflation, the other with high inflation. In contrast, when price rigidity is endogenous, the high> inflation equilibrium ceases to exist. Hence, time consistent equilibrium is unique. This result> depends on two features of the analysis: (1) a plausible quantitative specification of the fixed cost> of price change, and (2) the presence of an arbitrarily small cost of inflation that is independent of> price rigidity.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • Henry Siu, 2005. "Time Consistent Monetary Policy with Endogenous Price Rigidity," 2005 Meeting Papers 821, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed005:821
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Bonomo & Carlos Carvalho, 2010. "Imperfectly Credible Disinflation under Endogenous Time‐Dependent Pricing," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(5), pages 799-831, August.
    2. Jeffrey Campbell & Jacob Weber, 2021. "Discretion rather than rules: Equilibrium uniqueness and forward guidance with inconsistent optimal plans," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 41, pages 243-254, July.
    3. Roc Armenter, 2013. "The perils of nominal targets," Working Papers 14-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    4. David Arseneau, 2012. "Expectation traps in a new Keynesian open economy model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(1), pages 81-112, January.
    5. Eric Swanson & Gauti Eggertsson, 2007. "Optimal Time-Consistent Monetary Policy in the New Keynesian Model with Repeated Simultaneous Play," 2007 Meeting Papers 214, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Roc Armenter, 2014. "The Perils of Nominal Targets," 2014 Meeting Papers 428, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Schabert, Andreas, 2005. "Discretionary Policy, Multiple Equilibria, and Monetary Instruments," CEPR Discussion Papers 5400, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Orlando Gomes & Diana A. Mendes & Vivaldo M. Mendes & José Sousa Ramos, 2006. "Endogenous Cycles in Optimal Monetary Policywith a Nonlinear Phillips Curve," Working Papers Series 1 ercwp1508, ISCTE-IUL, Business Research Unit (BRU-IUL).
    9. Willem Van Zandweghe & Alexander L. Wolman, 2019. "Discretionary monetary policy in the Calvo model," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), pages 387-418, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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