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Monetary-Fiscal Interactions with a Conservative Central Bank

Author

Listed:
  • Luisa Lambertini
Abstract
We study macroeconomic stabilization when monetary and fiscal policies interact via their effects on output and inflation and the monetary authority is more conservative than the fiscal. We find that monetary-fiscal interactions result in poor macroeconomic stabilization. With both policies discretionary, the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal with higher output and lower inflation than optimal; the Nash equilibrium may be extreme with output higher and inflation lower than either authority want. Leadership equilibria are not second best. Monetary commitment is completely negated by fiscal discretion and yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks. But fiscal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion. Optimal macroeconomic stabilization requires either commitment of both monetary and fiscal policies, or identical targets for both authorities -- output socially optimal and inflation appropriately conservative -- or complete separation of tasks

Suggested Citation

  • Luisa Lambertini, 2004. "Monetary-Fiscal Interactions with a Conservative Central Bank," 2004 Meeting Papers 627, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed004:627
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Francesco Giuli & Marco Manzo, 2009. "Policy uncertainty, symbiosis, and the optimal fiscal and monetary conservativeness," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 461-474, November.
    2. Oliver Grimm & Stefan Ried, 2007. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 07/67, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    3. Nilsson, Kristian, 2008. "Conceptual Framework for Fiscal Policy," Occasional Papers 16, National Institute of Economic Research.
    4. Yuting Bai & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2013. "Infrequent Fiscal Stabilization," Working Papers 2013_01, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    5. Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Giuli, Francesco, 2011. "Fiscal and monetary interaction under monetary policy uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 369-375, June.
    6. Pasquale Foresti, 2018. "Monetary And Fiscal Policies Interaction In Monetary Unions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 226-248, February.
    7. Vines, David & Stehn, Sven Jari, 2008. "Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 6913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Libich, Jan & Nguyen, Dat Thanh & Stehlík, Petr, 2015. "Monetary exit and fiscal spillovers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 184-206.
    9. Matthew Canzoneri, 2007. "Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union: Policy Issues & Analytical Models," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2006 165, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
    10. Canzoneri, Matthew & Cumby, Robert & Diba, Behzad, 2010. "The Interaction Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 17, pages 935-999, Elsevier.
    11. Matthew B. Canzoneri, 2007. "Coordination Of Monetary And Fiscal Policy In A Monetary Union: Policy Issues And Analytical Models," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 75(s1), pages 21-43, September.
    12. Yuting Bai, 2014. "Price level targeting with strategic fiscal policy and the value of fiscal leadership," Working Papers 66983487, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    13. S. Gnocchi, 2007. "Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Area," Working Papers 602, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    14. Dat Thanh Nguyen & Viet Anh Hoang, 2020. "Monetary Consequences of Fiscal Stress in a Game Theoretic Framework," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 9(special i), pages 125-164.
    15. Brad E. Strum, 2009. "Monetary Policy in a Forward‐Looking Input–Output Economy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(4), pages 619-650, June.
    16. Hughes Hallett Andrew & Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2012. "Expectations Dynamics: Policy, Announcements and Limits to Dynamic Inconsistency," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-25, April.
    17. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2007-028 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy; Fiscal Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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