Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation
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- Fabian Herweg & Marco A. Schwarz, 2018. "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1995-2021, November.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Daniel Gurara & Mr. Kangni R Kpodar & Mr. Andrea F Presbitero & Dawit Tessema, 2020. "On the Capacity to Absorb Public Investment: How Much is Too Much?," IMF Working Papers 2020/048, International Monetary Fund.
- Matilde Cappelletti & Leonardo M. Giuffrida, 2024. "Targeted Bidders in Government Tenders," CESifo Working Paper Series 11142, CESifo.
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2020.
"Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2018. "Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 133, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Francesco Decarolis & Cristina Giorgiantonio, 2020. "Corruption red flags in public procurement: new evidence from Italian calls for tenders," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 544, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Kris De Jaegher & Michal Soltes & Vitezslav Titl, 2023. "Easing Renegotiation Rules in Public Procurement: Evidence from a Policy Reform," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp757, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2023.
"Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 377-399, April.
- Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2017. "Teaching an old dog a new trick: reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," CEIS Research Paper 404, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 05 May 2017.
- Gurara, Daniel & Kpodar, Kangni & Presbitero, Andrea F. & Tessema, Dawit, 2021. "On the capacity to absorb public investment: How much is too much?☆," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
- Sander Onderstal & Yang Yang, 2020. "Cheap-talk Communication in Procurement Auctions: Theory and Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-013/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2022. "Supplier selection and contract enforcement: Evidence from performance bonding," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 980-1019, November.
- Engel, Eduardo & Fischer, Ronald D. & Galetovic, Alexander, 2024. "The company you keep: Renegotiations and adverse selection in transportation infrastructure," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 38(C).
- Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- He Huang & Zhipeng Li & De Liu & Hongyan Xu, 2022. "Auctioning IT Contracts with Renegotiable Scope," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(8), pages 6003-6023, August.
- Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich, 2022. "Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5146-5161, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
auction; cost overrun; procurement; renegotiation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2017-11-19 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-DES-2017-11-19 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2017-11-19 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2017-11-19 (Regulation)
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