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Fairness in Matching Markets: Experimental Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Tobias König

    (Linnaeus University)

  • Dorothea Kübler

    (WZB Berlin, TU Berlin)

  • Lydia Mechtenberg

    (University of Hamburg)

  • Renke Schmacker

    (WZB Berlin, DIW Berlin)

Abstract
We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified envy, while the strategy-proof SD ensures envy-freeness. When priorities are merit-based, many spectators prefer the Boston mechanism, and this preference increases when priorities are determined by luck. At the same time, there is support for SD, but mainly when priorities are merit-based. Stated voting motives indicate that choosing SD is driven by concerns for envy-freeness rather than strategy-proofness, while support for the Boston mechanism stems from the belief that strategic choices create entitlements.

Suggested Citation

  • Tobias König & Dorothea Kübler & Lydia Mechtenberg & Renke Schmacker, 2023. "Fairness in Matching Markets: Experimental Evidence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 442, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:442
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    matching markets; school choice; voting; Boston mechanism; sincere agents; justified envy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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