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Agency Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration

Author

Listed:
  • Jonathan Eaton

    (Yale University)

  • Harvey S. Rosen

    (Princeton University)

Abstract
In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of "bonding" executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the 1ong-run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account (1) their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement; (2) the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control; and (3) the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. we use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970's.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Eaton & Harvey S. Rosen, 1982. "Agency Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration," Working Papers 533, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    • Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:153
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    2. Masson, Robert Tempest, 1971. "Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(6), pages 1278-1292, Nov.-Dec..
    3. Goldberg, Victor P., 1980. "Bridges over contested terrain : Exploring the radical account of the employment relationship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 249-274, September.
    4. Wilbur G. Lewellen, 1968. "Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number lewe68-1.
    5. Rosen, Sherwin, 1974. "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 34-55, Jan.-Feb..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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