Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives
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- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 12258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Dai Yuan Li & Cong Wei Xie & Shu Hao Chen & Xiu Xiang Zou, 2019. "Research on the Pricing of Shared Ownership Housing," Applied Economics and Finance, Redfame publishing, vol. 6(1), pages 30-44, January.
- Mahavadi Dhanshyam & Samir K. Srivastava, 2021. "Governance structures for public infrastructure projects: Public–private management regimes, contractual forms and innovation," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(8), pages 652-668, August.
- Nicole B. Baker & Christian Haddad, 2024. "Private ownership and management control decisions in infrastructure from the perspective of Transaction Cost Theory: Evidence from emerging economies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 764-791, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
property rights; incomplete contracts; investment incentives; partnership dissolution; shared ownership;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2019-01-21 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2019-01-21 (Regulation)
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