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Parallel imports, drug innovation and international patent protection: a policy game

Author

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  • Acharyya, Rajat
  • Garcia-Alonso, Maria
Abstract
We consider a policy game between a high-income country hosting a drug innovator and a low-income country hosting a drug imitator. The low-income country chooses whether to enforce an International Patent Regime (strict IPR) or not (weak IPR) and the high-income country chooses whether to allow parallel imports (PI) of on-patent drugs or market based discrimination (MBD). We show that, for a moderately high imitation cost, both (Strict IPR, PI) and (Weak IPR, MBD) emerge as the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) policy choices. For relatively smaller imitation costs, (Weak IPR, MBD) is the unique SPNE policy choice. The welfare properties reveal that although innovation may be higher at the (Strict IPR, PI) policy regime, the market coverage and national welfare of the low-income country, and the total welfare are all lower. This opens up the efficiency issue of implementing TRIPS and at the same time allowing international exhaustion of patent rights.

Suggested Citation

  • Acharyya, Rajat & Garcia-Alonso, Maria, 2009. "Parallel imports, drug innovation and international patent protection: a policy game," MPRA Paper 30159, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30159
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Hai & Shao, Jing & Zhu, Stuart X., 2020. "Impacts of power dynamics and gray markets on supply chains," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    2. Acharyya, Rajat & García-Alonso, María D.C., 2012. "Income based price subsidies and parallel imports," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 25-41.
    3. Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio, 2017. "Pareto-improving income redistribution: expanding consumer access to the vaccines market," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 275-313, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Income Inequality; Intellectual Property Rights; India; TRIPS; Parallel Imports; Pharmaceuticals;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health

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