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Common and private property to exhaustible resources: theoretical implications for economic growth

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Listed:
  • Borissov, Kirill
  • Surkov, Alexander
Abstract
We develop two models of economic growth with exhaustible natural resources and consumers heterogeneous in time preferences. The first model assumes private ownership of natural resources. In the second model, natural resources are commonly owned and the resource extraction rate is chosen by voting. We show that if discount factors are given exogenously, the long-run rate of growth under private property is higher than or equal to that under common property. If the discount factors are formed endogenously, under some circumstances common property can result in a higher rate of growth than private property.

Suggested Citation

  • Borissov, Kirill & Surkov, Alexander, 2010. "Common and private property to exhaustible resources: theoretical implications for economic growth," MPRA Paper 27524, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27524
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Kirill Borissov & Stéphane Lambrecht, 2009. "Growth and distribution in an AK-model with endogenous impatience," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(1), pages 93-112, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kirill Borissov & Mikhail Pakhnin, 2018. "Economic growth and property rights on natural resources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 423-482, March.
    2. Kirill Borissov & Mikhail Pakhnin, 2018. "Economic growth and property rights on natural resources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 423-482, March.
    3. Susan Randolph & Patrick Guyer, 2011. "Tracking the Historical Evolution of States' Compliance with their Economics and Social Rights Obligations of Result: Insights from the Historical SERF Index," Economic Rights Working Papers 18, University of Connecticut, Human Rights Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    natural resources; economic growth; voting; private property; common property;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O4 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity

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