[go: up one dir, main page]

IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/115795.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On The Core Of An Economy With Arbitrary Consumption Sets And Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • Bhowmik, Anuj
Abstract
This paper analyses the properties of (strong) core allocations in a two-period asymmetric information economy that also involves both negligible and non-negligible agents as well as an infinite dimensional commodity space. Within this setup, we allow the consumption set of each agent to be an arbitrary subset of the commodity space that may not have any lower bound. Our first result deals with the robustness of the core and the strong core allocations with respect to the restrictions imposed on the size of the blocking coalitions in an economy with only non-negligible agents. The second result is a generalization of the first result to an economy that allows the simultaneous presence of negligible as well as non-negligible agents with the consideration of Aubin coalitions. Finally, we show that (strong) core allocations are coalitional fair in the sense that no coalition of negligible agents could redistribute among its members the net trade of any other coalition containing all non-negligible agents in a way that could assign a preferred bundle to each of its members, and vice versa.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhowmik, Anuj, 2022. "On The Core Of An Economy With Arbitrary Consumption Sets And Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 115795, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:115795
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/115795/1/MPRA_paper_115795.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/117938/1/Bhowmik.pdf
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmeidler, David, 1972. "A Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 579-580, May.
    2. Noguchi, Mitsunori, 2000. "A fuzzy core equivalence theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 143-158, August.
    3. Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Emma Moreno-García & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2006. "Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Rosa L. Matzkin & Daniel L. McFadden & James C. Moore & Nicholas C. Yann (ed.), Rationality and Equilibrium, pages 119-139, Springer.
    4. De Simone, Anna & Graziano, Maria Gabriella, 2003. "Cone conditions in oligopolistic market models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-73, February.
    5. Herves-Beloso, Carlos & Moreno-Garcia, Emma & Nunez-Sanz, Carmelo & Rui Pascoa, Mario, 2000. "Blocking Efficacy of Small Coalitions in Myopic Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 72-86, July.
    6. Marialaura Pesce, 2010. "On mixed markets with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(1), pages 23-53, October.
    7. Vind, Karl, 1972. "A Third Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 585-586, May.
    8. Bhowmik, Anuj & Cao, Jiling, 2012. "Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 396-403.
    9. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
    10. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, 1998. "A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 563-584.
    11. Maria Graziano & Maria Romaniello, 2012. "Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 269-303, February.
    12. Anuj Bhowmik, 2015. "Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 461-494, November.
    13. Chiara Donnini & Maria Graziano & Marialaura Pesce, 2014. "Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(1), pages 55-68, February.
    14. KOUTSOUGERAS, Leonidas C., 1998. "A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1428, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Grodal, Birgit, 1972. "A Second Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 581-583, May.
    16. Pesce, Marialaura, 2014. "The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 33-45.
    17. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Zame, William R., 1991. "Equilibrium theory in infinite dimensional spaces," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: W. Hildenbrand & H. Sonnenschein (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 34, pages 1835-1898, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bhowmik Anuj & Gabriella Graziano Maria, 2020. "Blocking Coalitions and Fairness in Asset Markets and Asymmetric Information Economies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-29, January.
    2. Bhowmik, Anuj & Graziano, Maria Gabriella, 2015. "On Vind’s theorem for an economy with atoms and infinitely many commodities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 26-36.
    3. Anuj Bhowmik, 2015. "Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 461-494, November.
    4. Bhowmik, Anuj & Cao, Jiling, 2013. "Robust efficiency in mixed economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 49-57.
    5. Pesce, Marialaura, 2014. "The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 33-45.
    6. Chiara Donnini & Marialaura Pesce, 2023. "Fairness and formation rules of coalitions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 933-960, December.
    7. He, Wei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2015. "Equilibrium theory under ambiguity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 86-95.
    8. Bhowmik, Anuj & Cao, Jiling, 2011. "Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 35618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Herves-Beloso, Carlos & Meo, Claudia & Moreno Garcia, Emma, 2011. "On core solutions in economies with asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 30258, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Apr 2011.
    10. Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Claudia Meo & Emma Moreno-García, 2014. "Information and size of coalitions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 545-563, April.
    11. Hervés-Beloso, Carlos & Moreno-Garci­a, Emma, 2008. "Competitive equilibria and the grand coalition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 697-706, July.
    12. Bhowmik, Anuj & Saha, Sandipan, 2022. "On blocking mechanisms in economies with club goods," MPRA Paper 114928, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Achille Basile & Maria Gabriella Graziano & Ciro Tarantino, 2018. "Coalitional fairness with participation rates," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 123(2), pages 97-139, March.
    14. Achille Basile & Robert P. Gilles & Maria Gabriella Graziano & Marialaura Pesce, 2021. "The Core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(3), pages 1085-1119, April.
    15. Javier Hervés-Estévez & Emma Moreno-García, 2015. "On restricted bargaining sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 631-645, August.
    16. Achille Basile & Maria Graziano & Marialaura Pesce, 2014. "On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 573-599, April.
    17. Anuj Bhowmik & Jiling Cao, 2013. "On the core and Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 537-560, August.
    18. Bhowmik, Anuj & Cao, Jiling, 2012. "Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 396-403.
    19. Evren, Özgür & Hüsseinov, Farhad, 2008. "Theorems on the core of an economy with infinitely many commodities and consumers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1180-1196, December.
    20. Hervés-Estévez, Javier & Moreno-García, Emma, 2012. "Some remarks on restricted bargaining sets," MPRA Paper 39385, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jun 2012.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mixed Economy; Core; Vind's theorem; Coalitionally fair allocations.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:115795. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.