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Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises
[Strategic default and bankruptcy law]

Author

Listed:
  • Chopard, Bertrand
  • Langlais, Eric
Abstract
We compare the influence of bankruptcy law on the risk of default and the rate of liquidation by banks. We show that it depends on whether it is pro-creditors or pro-debtors oriented, and on the intensity of competition between banks. Then , we analyse the various tools at the disposal of public authority in order to accomdate the transition from a pro-creditors regime to a pro-debtors one. In a sense, our results suggest that there may exist a kind of consistency between the aims assigned to law, the orientation of bankruptcy law and the level of competition in the banking system.

Suggested Citation

  • Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises [Strategic default and bankruptcy law]," MPRA Paper 14366, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14366
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    default risk; law & finance; bankruptcy law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G0 - Financial Economics - - General
    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance

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