[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pit/wpaper/5874.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Existence of trembling hand equilibrium in revision games with imperfect information

Author

Listed:
  • Sofia Moroni
Abstract
In revision games a group of players can move at stochastic opportunities before adeadline. Their payoffs are determined by the sequence of actions taken before the endof the game. In this paper I define trembling hand equilibrium in a large class of revisiongames that may feature incomplete and imperfect information, and show that tremblinghand equilibria exist. Since trembling hand perfect equilibria are also Nash, existence ofa Nash equilibrium follows.

Suggested Citation

  • Sofia Moroni, 2015. "Existence of trembling hand equilibrium in revision games with imperfect information," Working Paper 5874, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    • Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:5874
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econ.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/working_papers/Working%20Paper%20upload.16.14.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Attila Ambrus & James Burns & Yuhta Ishii, 2012. "Gradual Bidding in eBay-Like Auctions," Working Papers 12-12, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    2. Attila Ambrus & Shih En Lu, 2015. "A Continuous-Time Model of Multilateral Bargaining," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 208-249, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sofia Moroni, 2016. "Sniping in Proxy Auctions with Deadlines," Working Paper 5875, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    2. Sofia Moroni, 2018. "Games with Private Timing," Working Paper 6400, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    3. Dong Hao & Qi Shi & Jinyan Su & Bo An, 2021. "Cooperation, Retaliation and Forgiveness in Revision Games," Papers 2112.02271, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    4. Yuichiro Kamada & Michihiro Kandori, 2020. "Revision Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1599-1630, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dong Hao & Qi Shi & Jinyan Su & Bo An, 2021. "Cooperation, Retaliation and Forgiveness in Revision Games," Papers 2112.02271, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    2. Hugo Hopenhayn & Maryam Saeedi, 2016. "Bidding Dynamics in Auctions," NBER Working Papers 22716, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Ortner, Juan, 2019. "A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 720-733.
    4. , & , & , & ,, 2014. "Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    5. Sofia Moroni, 2020. "Existence of Trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Working Paper 6837, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    6. Marco Guerrazzi, 2021. "Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 44(1), pages 359-374, June.
    7. Ambrus, Attila & Greiner, Ben & Pathak, Parag A., 2015. "How individual preferences are aggregated in groups: An experimental study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 1-13.
    8. Bram Driesen & Peter Eccles & Nora Wegner, 2017. "A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1115-1135, November.
    9. Lu, Shih En, 2016. "Self-control and bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 390-413.
    10. Sofia Moroni, 2016. "Sniping in Proxy Auctions with Deadlines," Working Paper 5875, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    11. Alp Simsek & Muhamet Yildiz, 2016. "Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Xiaogang Che & Tilman Klumpp, 2016. "Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 168-201, May.
    13. Roy, Nilanjan, 2023. "Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    14. Sofia Moroni, 2019. "Existence of trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in games with stochastic timing of moves," Working Paper 6757, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    15. Peitz, Martin & Waldfogel, Joel, 2012. "The Oxford Handbook of the Digital Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195397840.
    16. Yuichiro Kamada & Michihiro Kandori, 2020. "Revision Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1599-1630, July.
    17. Dominic Coey & Bradley J. Larsen & Brennan C. Platt, 2020. "Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(12), pages 3748-3785, December.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:5874. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/depghus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.