[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pas/asarcc/2008-07.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Capture of Anti-Poverty Programs: An Analysis of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program in India

Author

Listed:
  • Raghbendra Jha
  • Sambit Bhattacharyya
  • Raghav Gaiha
  • Shylashri Shankar
Abstract
Using pooled household level data for the Indian states of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh we find that the size of landholdings is a negative predictor of participation in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program (NREGP). In state level analysis this pattern survives in Rajasthan but reverses in Andhra Pradesh where we notice a positive relationship. This paper examines whether this sign reversal in Andhra Pradesh is indicative of program capture in Andhra Pradesh and better targeting in Rajasthan. We compare land inequality, political interference, and geographical remoteness across the two states and conclude that program capture may be an issue in Andhra Pradesh, largely because of these reasons. We also find evidence of complementarity between NREGP and the Public Distribution System (PDS).

Suggested Citation

  • Raghbendra Jha & Sambit Bhattacharyya & Raghav Gaiha & Shylashri Shankar, 2008. "Capture of Anti-Poverty Programs: An Analysis of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program in India," ASARC Working Papers 2008-07, The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre.
    • Handle: RePEc:pas:asarcc:2008-07
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/asarc/pdf/papers/2008/WP2008_07.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. La Ferrara, Eliana, 2002. "Inequality and group participation: theory and evidence from rural Tanzania," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 235-273, August.
    2. Raghbendra Jha & Raghav Gaiha & Shylashri Shankar, 2008. "National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme in India - A Review," ASARC Working Papers 2008-01, The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre.
    3. Raghav Gaiha, 2000. "On the Targeting of the Employment Guarantee Scheme in the Indian State of Maharashtra," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 203-219, October.
    4. Baron, David P., 1994. "Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 33-47, March.
    5. Dilip Mookherjee & Pranab K. Bardhan, 2000. "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 135-139, May.
    6. Lanjouw, Peter & Ravallion, Martin, 1999. "Benefit Incidence, Public Spending Reforms, and the Timing of Program Capture," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 13(2), pages 257-273, May.
    7. Jonathan Conning & Michael Kevane, 2000. "Community Based Targeting for Social Safety Nets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-09, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    8. Ravallion, Martin, 2000. "Monitoring Targeting Performance When Decentralized Allocations to the Poor Are Unobserved," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 14(2), pages 331-345, May.
    9. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
    10. Raghav Gaiha, 2000. "Do Anti-poverty Programmes Reach the Rural Poor in India?," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(1), pages 71-95.
    11. Galasso, Emanuela & Ravallion, Martin, 2005. "Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(4), pages 705-727, April.
    12. Dayton-Johnson, Jeff, 2000. "Determinants of collective action on the local commons: a model with evidence from Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 181-208, June.
    13. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1998. "Wealth Inequality and Efficiency in the Commons, Part II: The Regulated Case," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(1), pages 1-22, January.
    14. Bardhan, Pranab & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2005. "Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(4), pages 675-704, April.
    15. Alderman, Harold, 2002. "Do local officials know something we don't? Decentralization of targeted transfers in Albania," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 375-404, March.
    16. Conning, Jonathan & Kevane, Michael, 2002. "Community-Based Targeting Mechanisms for Social Safety Nets: A Critical Review," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 375-394, March.
    17. Conning, Jonathan & Kevane, Michael, 2001. "Community based targeting mechanisms for social safety nets," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 23146, The World Bank.
    18. Grogger, Jeffrey, 1990. "A simple test for exogeneity in probit, logit, and poisson regression models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 329-332, August.
    19. Gaiha, Raghav, 2000. "On the Targeting of the Employment Guarantee Scheme in the Indian State of Maharashtra," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 203-219.
    20. Seabright, Paul, 1996. "Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 61-89, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ghazala Mansuri, 2004. "Community-Based and -Driven Development: A Critical Review," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 19(1), pages 1-39.
    2. Galasso, Emanuela & Ravallion, Martin, 2005. "Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(4), pages 705-727, April.
    3. Chikako Yamauchi, 2010. "Community-Based Targeting and Initial Local Conditions: Evidence from Indonesia's IDT Program," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 95-147, October.
    4. Baird, Sarah & McIntosh, Craig & Özler, Berk, 2013. "The regressive demands of demand-driven development," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 27-41.
    5. Park, Albert & Wang, Sangui, 2010. "Community-based development and poverty alleviation: An evaluation of China's poor village investment program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 790-799, October.
    6. Pan, Lei & Christiaensen, Luc, 2012. "Who is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 1619-1633.
    7. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Emilie CALDEIRA, 2014. "La décentralisation dans les pays en développement : une revue de la littérature - Decentralization in developing countries: A literature review," Working Papers 201411, CERDI.
    8. Han, Huawei & Gao, Qin, 2019. "Community-based welfare targeting and political elite capture: Evidence from rural China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 145-159.
    9. Haseeb, Muhammad & Vyborny, Kate, 2022. "Data, discretion and institutional capacity: Evidence from cash transfers in Pakistan," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    10. Kilic,Talip & Whitney,Edward Matthew & Winters,Paul Conal & Kilic,Talip & Whitney,Edward Matthew & Winters,Paul Conal, 2013. "Decentralized beneficiary targeting in large-scale development programs : insights from the Malawi farm input subsidy program," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6713, The World Bank.
    11. Emilie Caldeira & Martial Foucault & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2014. "Does Decentralization Facilitate Access to Poverty-Related Services? Evidence from Benin," NBER Chapters, in: African Successes, Volume I: Government and Institutions, pages 57-102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Dilip Mookherjee & Pranab K. Bardhan, 2000. "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 135-139, May.
    13. Muhammad Haseeb & Kate Vyborny, 2016. "Imposing institutions: Evidence from cash transfer reform in Pakistan," CSAE Working Paper Series 2016-36, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    14. Bardhan, Pranab & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2005. "Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(4), pages 675-704, April.
    15. Emilie Caldeira & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2015. "La décentralisation dans les pays en développement : une revue de la littérature - Decentralization in developing countries: A literature review," CERDI Working papers halshs-01005204, HAL.
    16. Henderson, Heath & Follett, Lendie, 2022. "Targeting social safety net programs on human capabilities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    17. Simons, Andrew M., 2022. "What is the optimal locus of control for social assistance programs? Evidence from the Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    18. Grillos, Tara, 2017. "Participatory Budgeting and the Poor: Tracing Bias in a Multi-Staged Process in Solo, Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 343-358.
    19. Kis-Katos, Krisztina & Sjahrir, Bambang Suharnoko, 2017. "The impact of fiscal and political decentralization on local public investment in Indonesia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 344-365.
    20. François Bourguignon & Francisco Ferreira & Michael Walton, 2007. "Equity, efficiency and inequality traps: A research agenda," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 5(2), pages 235-256, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capture; Poverty; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pas:asarcc:2008-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Raghbendra Jha (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/asanuau.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.