[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/otg/wpaper/0705.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Substitutability and protectionism: Latin AmericaÕs trade policy and imports from China and India

Author

Listed:
  • Giovanni Facchini

    (Universita degli Studi di Milano, University of Illinois, Centro Studi Luca dÕAgliano and CEPR)

  • Marcelo Olarreaga

    (World Bank and CEPR)

  • Peri Silva

    (University of North Dakota)

  • Gerald Willmann

    (Department of Economics, University of Otago)

Abstract
This paper examines the trade policy response of Latin American governments to the rapid growth of China and India in world markets. To explain higher protection in sectors where a large share is imported from these countries, we extend the 'protection for sale' model to allow for different degrees of substitutability between domestically produced and imported varieties. The extension suggests that higher levels of protection towards Chinese goods can be explained by high substitutability between domestically produced goods and Chinese goods, whereas lower levels of protection towards goods imported from India can be explained by low substitutability with domestically produced goods. The data supports the extension to the 'protection for sale' model, which performs better than the original specification in terms of explaining Latin America's structure of protection.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Facchini & Marcelo Olarreaga & Peri Silva & Gerald Willmann, 2007. "Substitutability and protectionism: Latin AmericaÕs trade policy and imports from China and India," Working Papers 0705, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2007.
    • Handle: RePEc:otg:wpaper:0705
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.business.otago.ac.nz/econ/research/discussionpapers/DP_0705.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2007
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hiau LooiKee & Alessandro Nicita & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2009. "Estimating Trade Restrictiveness Indices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 172-199, January.
    2. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
    3. Giovanni Facchini & Johannes Van Biesebroeck & Gerald Willmann, 2006. "Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(3), pages 845-873, August.
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 667-690, September.
    5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    6. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G, 1981. "Several Tests for Model Specification in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 781-793, May.
    7. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoğlu, 2016. "“Protection For Sale” In A Developing Country: Democracy Vs. Dictatorship," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 9, pages 163-174, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Chang, Pao-Li, 2005. "Protection for sale under monopolistic competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 509-526, July.
    10. Hiau Looi Kee & Alessandro Nicita & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2008. "Import Demand Elasticities and Trade Distortions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 666-682, November.
    11. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet Ulubaşoğlu, 2016. "Can we obtain realistic parameter estimates for the ‘protection for sale’ model?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 10, pages 175-198, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 1, pages 3-21, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    13. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    14. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
    15. Phillip McCalman, 2004. "Protection for Sale and Trade Liberalization: an Empirical Investigation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 81-94, February.
    16. Alessandro Nicita & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2007. "Trade, Production, and Protection Database, 1976--2004," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 21(1), pages 165-171.
    17. Gawande, Kishore, 1997. "Generated regressors in linear and nonlinear models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 119-126, February.
    18. K. Sato, 1967. "A Two-Level Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution Production Function," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 34(2), pages 201-218.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wignaraja, Ganeshan & Ramizo, Dorothea & Burmeister, Luca, 2012. "Asia-Latin America Free Trade Agreements: An Instrument for Inter-Regional Liberalization and Integration?," ADBI Working Papers 382, Asian Development Bank Institute.
    2. Masahiro Kawai, 2009. "PRC-Latin America Economic Cooperation: Going beyond Resource and Manufacturing Complementarity," Working Papers id:1961, eSocialSciences.
    3. Silva, Peri, 2011. "The role of importers and exporters in the determination of the U.S. tariff preferences granted to Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 207-219, March.
    4. Aboushady, Nora & Zaki, Chahir, 2023. "Are global value chains for sale? On business-state relations in the MENA region," IDOS Discussion Papers 17/2023, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
    5. Elena Paltseva, 2014. "Protection for Sale: The case of oligopolistic competition and interdependent sectors," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(4), pages 1195-1216, November.
    6. Lourenço S. Paz & Kul Prasad Kapri, 2019. "The Effects of the Chinese Imports on Brazilian Manufacturing Workers," Economies, MDPI, vol. 7(3), pages 1-22, August.
    7. repec:lic:licosd:28511 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Daniel Lederman & Marcelo Olarreaga & Guillermo Perry, 2007. "Latin America´s response to China and India: overview of research findings and policy implications - Observatorio de Política," Revista de Economía y Estadística, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas, vol. 45(1), pages 149-193, Junio.
    9. Lourenço S. Paz, 2022. "The China Shock Impact on Labor Informality: The Effects on Brazilian Manufacturing Workers," Economies, MDPI, vol. 10(5), pages 1-19, May.
    10. Hylke VANDENBUSSCHE & Christian VIEGELAHN, 2011. "No Protectionist Surprises: EU Antidumping Policy Before and During the Great Recession," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2011021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    11. Lourenco Paz, 2022. "Does age modulate the impact of import competition on job type?," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 11(4), pages 161-171.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. By Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2012. "Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 115-132, February.
    2. Gawande, Kishore & Krishna, Pravin & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2009. "What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 491-532, July.
    3. Saha, Amrita, 2019. "Trade policy & lobbying effectiveness: Theory and evidence for India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 165-192.
    4. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2009. "Is protection really for sale? A survey and directions for future research," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 181-191, March.
    5. Marianna Belloc, 2007. "Protection for Sale in the EU," Working Papers in Public Economics 100, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    6. Baybars Karacaovali, 2011. "Trade Policy Determinants and Trade Reform in a Developing Country," Working Papers 201115, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    7. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2009. "Protection for sale or surge protection?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 675-688, August.
    8. Gawande, Kishore & Hoekman, Bernard, 2006. "Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 527-561, July.
    9. Silva, Peri, 2011. "The role of importers and exporters in the determination of the U.S. tariff preferences granted to Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 207-219, March.
    10. Tovar, Patricia, 2011. "Lobbying costs and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 126-136, March.
    11. Baybars Karacaovali, 2012. "Trade Policy Determinants and Trade Reform in a Developing Country: The Case of Colombia," Working Papers 201220R, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    12. Giovanni Facchini & Johannes Van Biesebroeck & Gerald Willmann, 2006. "Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 845-873, August.
    13. Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Maria Petrova & Ruben Enikolopov, 2008. "The Dracula effect: voter information and trade policy," Economics Working Papers 1296, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2020.
    14. Giacomo Ponzetto, 2008. "Asymmetric information and trade policy," Economics Working Papers 1253, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2010.
    15. Imai, Susumu & Katayama, Hajime & Krishna, Kala, 2013. "A quantile-based test of protection for sale model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 40-52.
    16. Dutt, Pushan & Mitra, Devashish, 2009. "Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns : The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 50299, World Bank.
    17. Andrew Jonelis & Wisarut Suwanprasert, 2022. "Protection for sale: evidence from around the world," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 237-267, April.
    18. Rigoberto A. Lopez & Xenia Matschke, 2006. "Food Protection for Sale," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(3), pages 380-391, August.
    19. Richard Damania & Per Fredriksson & Thomas Osang, 2004. "Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 279-308, February.
    20. Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2011. "Heterogeneous Information and Trade Policy," 2011 Meeting Papers 189, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Latin America; Protectionism;

    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:otg:wpaper:0705. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Janet Bryant (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/etotanz.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.