[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/osfxxx/a2dyq.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Enhancing Public Support for International Sanctions

Author

Listed:
  • Kantorowicz, Jaroslaw
  • Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Elena

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Abstract
International sanctions are commonly used when military intervention is particularly undesirable. The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the saliency of sanctions, as well as their high domestic costs for the sender states. Democratic states require public support to sustain long and costly sanctions. Yet empirical research on public perception and support for sanctions is scarce. We conduct two experimental studies on quota-representative samples in Poland and Germany using the context of the sanctions on Russia. The first study uses a novel conjoint experiment with the goal to examine how features of a sanctioning regime shape public support for sanctions. As expected, support increases with a decrease in domestic costs and increases in costs imposed on the target state. In addition, aid programs, which can mitigate domestic costs, and beneficial policy alternatives (e.g., developing sustainable energy to replace Russian oil) can enhance support. Furthermore, public support for sanctions requires larger sanctioning countries’ coalitions. In the second—information experiment—study, we find that people overestimate the sanctions’ costs for their country and that correcting this perception through the provision of estimated costs increases reported support. Yet, contrasting sanctions costs with other costs has no additional effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Kantorowicz, Jaroslaw & Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Elena, 2023. "Enhancing Public Support for International Sanctions," OSF Preprints a2dyq, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:osfxxx:a2dyq
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/a2dyq
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/6479f5de3c3a3806eda043c0/
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/a2dyq?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sheppard, Jill & von Stein, Jana, 2022. "Attitudes and Action in International Refugee Policy: Evidence from Australia," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 929-956, April.
    2. Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 786-793, September.
    3. Bechtel, Michael & Hainmueller, Jens & Hangartner, Dominik & Helbling, Marc, 2015. "Reality Bites: The Limits of Framing Effects for Salient and Contested Policy Issues," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 3(3), pages 683-695.
    4. Roth, Christopher & Settele, Sonja & Wohlfart, Johannes, 2022. "Beliefs about public debt and the demand for government spending," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 231(1), pages 165-187.
    5. Margaret P. Doxey, 1987. "International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-18750-8, October.
    6. Drezner, Daniel W., 2000. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 73-102, January.
    7. Drezner, Daniel W., 2003. "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 643-659, July.
    8. Hainmueller, Jens & Hopkins, Daniel J. & Yamamoto, Teppei, 2014. "Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 1-30, January.
    9. Stephen A. Borrelli & Brad Lockerbie, 2008. "Framing Effects on Public Opinion During Prewar and Major Combat Phases of the U.S. Wars with Iraq," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 89(2), pages 502-522, June.
    10. Page, Benjamin I. & Shapiro, Robert Y., 1983. "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 175-190, March.
    11. Clayton Webb, 2018. "Power Politics or Public Pandering? An Empirical Investigation of Economic Sanctions and Presidential Approval," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(3), pages 491-509, May.
    12. Nossal, Kim Richard, 1989. "International sanctions as international punishment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 301-322, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Estrada, Mario Arturo Ruiz & Koutronas, Evangelos, 2022. "The impact of the Russian Aggression against Ukraine on the Russia-EU Trade," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 599-616.
    2. Jin Mun Jeong & Dursun Peksen, 2019. "Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(1), pages 194-217, January.
    3. David Lektzian & Glen Biglaiser, 2014. "The effect of foreign direct investment on the use and success of US sanctions," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(1), pages 70-93, February.
    4. Valentin L. Krustev & T. Clifton Morgan, 2011. "Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 351-376, September.
    5. Timothy M Peterson, 2020. "Reconsidering economic leverage and vulnerability: Trade ties, sanction threats, and the success of economic coercion," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 409-429, July.
    6. William Seitz & Alberto Zazzaro, 2020. "Sanctions and public opinion: The case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 817-843, October.
    7. Daniel Verdier, 2009. "Sanctions as revelation regimes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(3), pages 251-278, September.
    8. Sigit Perdana & Marc Vielle & Maxime Schenckery, 2022. "European Economic impacts of cutting energy imports from Russia : A computable general equilibrium analysis," Post-Print hal-03887431, HAL.
    9. Denise Guthrie & Erick Duchesne, 2003. "(Mis)Selection Effects and Sovereignty Costs: An Alternative Measure of the Costs of Sanctions," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20032, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
    10. Timothy M. Peterson, 2014. "Taking the cue: The response to US human rights sanctions against third parties," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(2), pages 145-167, April.
    11. Roel Dom & Lionel Roger, 2018. "Economic sanctions and domestic debt: Burundi's fiscal response to the suspension of budget support," Discussion Papers 2018-12, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    12. Caruso Raul, 2003. "The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 1-36, April.
    13. von Soest, Christian & Wahman, Michael, 2013. "Sanctions and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era," GIGA Working Papers 212, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    14. Bělín, Matěj & Hanousek, Jan, 2021. "Which sanctions matter? analysis of the EU/russian sanctions of 2014," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 244-257.
    15. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Alexander H. Montgomery, 2008. "Power or Plenty," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(2), pages 213-242, April.
    16. Nikolay Marinov, 2005. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(3), pages 564-576, July.
    17. Accominotti, Olivier & Albers, Thilo & Kessler, Philipp & Oosterlinck, Kim, 2023. "Sovereign defaults and international trade: Germany and its creditors in the 1930s," CEPR Discussion Papers 18703, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2009. "Economic Diplomacy and the Geography of International Trade," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13518.
    19. Thomas Bernauer & Steffen Mohrenberg & Vally Koubi, 2020. "Do citizens evaluate international cooperation based on information about procedural and outcome quality?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 505-529, April.
    20. Langlois Catherine C & Langlois Jean-Pierre P., 2010. "Costly Interference: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Sanctions," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-34, June.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:osfxxx:a2dyq. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://osf.io/preprints/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.