On the Max Min Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 133-150, December.
- VIEILLE, Nicolas & ROSENBERG, Dinah & SOLAN, Eilon, 2001. "On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," HEC Research Papers Series 760, HEC Paris.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers hal-00593645, HAL.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," Working Papers hal-00242999, HAL.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "On the MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1344, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464949, HAL.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
- Xavier Venel, 2015. "Commutative Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 40(2), pages 403-428, February.
- Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003.
"Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 911-929, November.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vielle, 2002. "Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games," Discussion Papers 1355, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan, 2003. "Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games," Post-Print hal-00464953, HAL.
- Nicolas, VIEILLE & Eilon, SOLAN, 2003. "Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games," HEC Research Papers Series 772, HEC Paris.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games," Working Papers hal-00591681, HAL.
- Levy, Yehuda, 2012.
"Stochastic games with information lag,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 243-256.
- Yehuda (John) Levy, 2009. "Stochastic Games with Information Lag," Discussion Paper Series dp499, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Jean-Francois Mertens & Abraham Neyman & Dinah Rosenberg, 2007.
"Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp456, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Jean-Francois Mertens & Abraham Neyman & Dinah Rosenberg, 2007. "Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000178, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jean-François Mertens & Abraham Neyman & Dinah Rosenberg, 2009.
"Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 34(2), pages 257-262, May.
- Jean-Francois Mertens & Abraham Neyman & Dinah Rosenberg, 2007. "Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000178, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jean-Francois Mertens & Abraham Neyman & Dinah Rosenberg, 2007. "Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces," Discussion Paper Series dp456, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Eilon Solan, 2005.
"Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 30(1), pages 51-72, February.
- Eilon Solan, 2002. "Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations," Discussion Papers 1356, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Abraham Neyman, 2002. "Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax," Discussion Paper Series dp295, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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