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Endogenous Network Formation in Congress

Author

Listed:
  • Nathan Canen
  • Francesco Trebbi
Abstract
This paper presents and structurally estimates a model of endogenous network formation and legislative activity of career-motivated politicians. Employing data on socialization and legislative effort of members of the 105th-110th U.S. Congresses, our model reconciles a set of empirical regularities, including: recent trends in Congressional productivity; the complementarity of socialization processes and legislative activities in the House of Representatives; substantial heterogeneity across legislators in terms of effort and success rate in passing specific legislation. We avoid taking the social structure of Congress as exogenously given and instead embed it in a model of endogenous network formation useful for developing relevant counterfactuals, including some pertinent to the congressional emergency response to the 2008-09 financial crisis. Our counterfactual analysis further demonstrates how to empirically identify the specific equilibrium at play within each Congress among the multiple equilibria typically present in this class of games.

Suggested Citation

  • Nathan Canen & Francesco Trebbi, 2016. "Endogenous Network Formation in Congress," NBER Working Papers 22756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22756
    Note: POL
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eduardo Alemán & Ernesto Calvo, 2013. "Explaining Policy Ties in Presidential Congresses: A Network Analysis of Bill Initiation Data," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 61(2), pages 356-377, June.
    2. Yann Bramoull? & Rachel Kranton & Martin D'Amours, 2014. "Strategic Interaction and Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(3), pages 898-930, March.
    3. Cabrales, Antonio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves, 2011. "Social interactions and spillovers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 339-360, June.
    4. Bartels, Larry M., 1993. "Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 267-285, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Battaglini & Eleonora Patacchini, 2018. "Influencing Connected Legislators," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(6), pages 2277-2322.
    2. Anton Badev, 2021. "Nash Equilibria on (Un)Stable Networks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1179-1206, May.
    3. Facundo Albornoz & Antonio Cabrales & Esther Hauk, 2019. "Occupational Choice with Endogenous Spillovers," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(621), pages 1953-1970.
    4. Nikolaj Harmon & Raymond Fisman & Emir Kamenica, 2018. "Peer Effects in Legislative Voting," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series dp-304, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    5. Nikolaj Harmon & Raymond Fisman & Emir Kamenica, 2019. "Peer Effects in Legislative Voting," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 156-180, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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