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Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing

Author

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  • Manuel Amador
  • Javier Bianchi
Abstract
We present a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model of self-fulfilling bank runs, where banks trade capital in competitive and liquid markets but remain vulnerable to runs due to a loss of creditor confidence. We characterize how the vulnerability of an individual bank depends on its leverage position and the economy wide asset prices. We study the effect of credit easing policies, in the form of asset purchases. When a banking crisis is generated by runs, credit easing can reduce the number of defaulting banks and enhance welfare. When the crisis is driven by fundamentals, credit easing may have adverse consequences.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel Amador & Javier Bianchi, 2021. "Bank Runs, Fragility, and Credit Easing," NBER Working Papers 29397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29397
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    2. Mengus, Eric, 2023. "Asset purchase bailouts and endogenous implicit guarantees," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    3. Javier Bianchi, 2022. "The Research Agenda: Javier Bianchi on Financial Crises and Prudential Policies," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 23(1), April.
    4. Kaldorf, Matthias & Rottner, Matthias, 2024. "Climate Minsky Moments and endogenous financial crises," Discussion Papers 26/2024, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    5. Rottner, Matthias, 2023. "Financial crises and shadow banks: A quantitative analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 74-92.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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