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Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves

Author

Listed:
  • Doruk Cetemen
  • Can Urgun
  • Leeat Yariv
Abstract
We study a model of collective search by teams. Discoveries beget discoveries and correlated search results are governed by a Brownian path. Search results' variation at any point---the search scope---is jointly controlled. Agents individually choose when to cease search and implement their best discovery. We characterize equilibrium and optimal policies. Search scope is constant and independent of search outcomes as long as no member leaves. It declines after departures. A simple drawdown stopping boundary governs each agent’s search termination. We show the emergence of endogenous exit waves, whereby possibly heterogeneous agents cease search all at once.

Suggested Citation

  • Doruk Cetemen & Can Urgun & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves," NBER Working Papers 29008, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29008
    Note: EFG IO POL PR
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • O35 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Social Innovation

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