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How Common are Electoral Cycles in Criminal Sentencing?

Author

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  • Christian Dippel
  • Michael Poyker
Abstract
Existing research on electoral sentencing cycles shows that elected judges levy longer sentences when they are up for re-election. Using newly collected sentencing data including a number of states not previously studied, we find that elected judges in several states do not appear to change their sentencing when they are up for re-election. This heterogeneity in the presence of electoral sentencing cycles appears to be best explained by cross-state variation in the competitiveness of judicial elections. Incumbent judges do levy harsher sentences when they are in a competitive re-election campaign, but in states where competition for judgeships is low this does not come to the forefront.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Dippel & Michael Poyker, 2019. "How Common are Electoral Cycles in Criminal Sentencing?," NBER Working Papers 25716, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25716
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. David Abrams & Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Arnaud Philippe, 2023. "Electoral Sentencing Cycles," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 350-370.
    2. Christian Dippel & Michael Poyker, 2023. "Do Private Prisons Affect Criminal Sentencing?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(3), pages 511-534.
    3. Chika O. Okafor, 2021. "Prosecutor Politics: The Impact of Election Cycles on Criminal Sentencing in the Era of Rising Incarceration," Papers 2110.09169, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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