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Integrated Political Strategy

Author

Listed:
  • John M. de Figueiredo
Abstract
This paper reviews the literature on corporate political strategy and identifies a number of open research questions and streams for potential investigation. The paper develops a framework to explain why, when, and how a firm will pursue multi-forum political action as part of its non-market and integrated strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • John M. de Figueiredo, 2009. "Integrated Political Strategy," NBER Working Papers 15053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15053
    Note: LE POL
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan P. Doh & Thomas Lawton & Tazeeb Rajwani, 2012. "Advancing Nonmarket Strategy Research : Institutional Perspectives in a Changing World," Post-Print hal-02276718, HAL.
    2. Addis G. Birhanu & Alfonso Gambardella & Giovanni Valentini, 2016. "Bribery and investment: Firm-level evidence from Africa and Latin America," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9), pages 1865-1877, September.
    3. Yongwook Paik & Sukhun Kang & Robert Seamans, 2019. "Entrepreneurship, innovation, and political competition: How the public sector helps the sharing economy create value," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 503-532, April.
    4. Klopf, Patricia & Nell, Phillip C., 2018. "How “space” and “place” influence subsidiary host country political embeddedness," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 186-197.
    5. repec:ces:ifodic:v:8:y:2010:i:4:p:14994986 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Simona Giorgi & Massimo Maoret & Edward J. Zajac, 2019. "On the Relationship Between Firms and Their Legal Environment: The Role of Cultural Consonance," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(4), pages 803-830, July.
    7. Aranda Gutierrez, Ana, 2016. "Thank you for (not) smoking : Essays on organizational theory and strategy in a contested industry," Other publications TiSEM ec7e4803-0702-496c-8b36-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Klein, Peter G. & Mahoney, Joseph T. & McGahan, Anita M. & Pitelis, Christos N., 2011. "Resources, Capabilities, and Routines in Public Organization," Working Papers 11-0101, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    9. Thomas Wrona & Corinna Sinzig, 2018. "Nonmarket strategy research: systematic literature review and future directions," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 88(2), pages 253-317, February.
    10. Young Hou & Christopher W. Poliquin, 2023. "The effects of CEO activism: Partisan consumer behavior and its duration," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 672-703, March.
    11. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Dennis A. Yao, 2018. "Integrated Strategy: Residual Market and Exchange Imperfections as the Foundation of Sustainable Competitive Advantage," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 3(2), pages 463-480, June.
    12. Caterina Moschieri & Maria Fernandez-Moya, 2022. "A dynamic long-term approach to internationalization: Spanish publishing firms’ expansion and emigrants in Mexico (1939–1977)," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 53(5), pages 818-849, July.
    13. Silke Friedrich, 2010. "Measuring Interest Group Activity," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(04), pages 37-46, January.
    14. Silke Friedrich, 2010. "Measuring Interest Group Activity," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(4), pages 37-46, 01.
    15. Gautam Ahuja & Sai Yayavaram, 2011. "PERSPECTIVE ---Explaining Influence Rents: The Case for an Institutions-Based View of Strategy," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(6), pages 1631-1652, December.
    16. David P. Baron & Margaret Neale & Hayagreeva Rao, 2016. "Extending Nonmarket Strategy: Political Economy and the Radical Flank Effect in Private Politics," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 1(2), pages 105-126, June.
    17. Zheng, Weiting & Ang, Siah Hwee & Singh, Kulwant, 2022. "The interface of market and nonmarket strategies: Political ties and strategic competitive actions," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(4).

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    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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