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Rat Races and Glass Ceilings: Career Paths in Organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Bardsley, P.
  • Sherstyuk, K.
Abstract
In an ongoing organization, such as a large law parternship firm, employees are motivated not only by current rewards but also by the prospect of promotion, and the opportunity to influence policy and make the rules in the future. This leads to a dynamic programming problem in contract design. We model career design in such a firm as a recursive mechanism design problem in an overlapping generations environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Bardsley, P. & Sherstyuk, K., 2001. "Rat Races and Glass Ceilings: Career Paths in Organizations," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 825, The University of Melbourne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:825
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    File URL: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/downloads/wpapers-00-01/825.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sicherman, Nachum & Galor, Oded, 1990. "A Theory of Career Mobility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 169-192, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CONTRACTS ; GENERATIONS ; COSTS;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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