The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
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Other versions of this item:
- David Genesove & Wallace Mullin, 1999. "The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange," NBER Chapters, in: Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries, pages 103-144, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 1997. "The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange," NBER Working Papers 5981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Anthony Creane, 2008. "Input Suppliers, Differential Pricing, and Information Sharing Agreements," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(4), pages 865-893, December.
- Fabio Panetta & Fabiano Schivardi & Matthew Shum, 2009.
"Do Mergers Improve Information? Evidence from the Loan Market,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(4), pages 673-709, June.
- Fabio Panetta & Fabiano Schivardi & Matthew Shum, 2009. "Do Mergers Improve Information? Evidence from the Loan Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(4), pages 673-709, June.
- Fabio Panetta & Fabiano Schivardi & Matthew Shum, 2004. "Do mergers improve information? evidence from the loan market," Proceedings 942, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Fabio Panetta & Fabiano Schivardi & Matthew Shum, 2004. "Do mergers improve information? Evidence from the loan market," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 521, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Panetta, Fabio & Schivardi, Fabiano & Shum, Matthew, 2005. "Do Mergers Improve Information? Evidence from the Loan Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 4961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Helmuts Āzacis & Péter Vida, 2015.
"Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 125-160, January.
- Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, P ter, 2012. "Collusive Communication Schemes in a First-Price Auction," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Georg Clemens & Holger A. Rau, 2022. "Either with us or against us: experimental evidence on partial cartels," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 237-257, September.
- Martin, Stephen, 2006. "Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1299-1332, November.
- Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014.
"Communication in Cournot oligopoly,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
- Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Yin, Xundong & Wang, Sophie Xuefei & Lu, Yuanzhu & Yan, Jianye, 2023. "Endogenous information acquisition and disclosure of private information in a duopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
- Lee, Gea M., 2010.
"Optimal collusion with internal contracting,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 646-669, March.
- Gea Myoung Lee, 2008. "Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting," Working Papers 08-2008, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Gea M. Lee, 2008. "Optimal Collusion with Internal Contracting," Development Economics Working Papers 22466, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Dye, Alan & Sicotte, Richard, 2006. "How brinkmanship saved Chadbourne: Credibility and the International Sugar Agreement of 1931," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 223-256, April.
- Jos Jansen, 2008. "Information Acquisition and Strategic Disclosure in Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 113-148, March.
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More about this item
Keywords
INFORMATION ; TRADE ; SUGAR;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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