(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)"> (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)">
[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mie/wpaper/283.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

'Cleaning up' while Cleaning up: Pollution Abatement, Interest Groups and Contingent Trade Policies

Author

Listed:
  • Leidy, M.P.
  • Hoekman, B.M.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the political economy of environmental-policy formation in a trading economy with established rules for administered protection. We argue that the social costs associated with the adoption of an inefficient environmental regime are likely to be compounded by induced restrictions on trade when the effected industries are import competing. The preferences of interest groups for alternative environmental regimes tend to be linked to the legal-institutional setting in which trade policy is conducted. Under existing rules and practices in the area of administered protection, there is reason to believe that interest group preferences for an inefficient approach to pollution control will be strengthened because the adoption of such a regime is more likely to lead to a concomitant increase in trade barriers. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Leidy, M.P. & Hoekman, B.M., 1991. "'Cleaning up' while Cleaning up: Pollution Abatement, Interest Groups and Contingent Trade Policies," Working Papers 283, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
    • Handle: RePEc:mie:wpaper:283
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rauscher, Michael, 1995. "Protectionists, environmentalists, and the formation of environmental policy in an open economy," Discussion Papers, Series II 256, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    2. Bommer, Rolf, 1995. "Environmental policy and industrial competitiveness: The pollution haven hypothesis reconsidered," Discussion Papers, Series II 262, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    3. Eliste, Paavo & Fredriksson, Per G., 2002. "Environmental Regulations, Transfers, and Trade: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 234-250, March.
    4. Sturm, Daniel & Ulph, Alistair, 2002. "Environment, trade, political economy and imperfect information: a survey," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0204, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    5. Hillberry, Russell & Zurita, Carlos, 2020. "A Cross-country Assessment of Commitment Behavior in the Trade Facilitation Agreement," Conference papers 333183, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    6. Xinpeng Xu, 2000. "International Trade and Environmental Regulation: Time Series Evidence and Cross Section Test," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(3), pages 233-257, November.
    7. Per Fredriksson, 2001. "How Pollution Taxes may Increase Pollution and Reduce Net Revenues," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 65-85, April.
    8. Damania, Richard & Fredriksson, Per G. & List, John A., 2003. "Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: theory and evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 490-512, November.
    9. Damania, Richard & Fredriksson, Per G., 2003. "Trade policy reform, endogenous lobby group formation, and environmental policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 47-69, September.
    10. Taner Güney, 2015. "Environmental sustainability and pressure groups," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 49(6), pages 2331-2344, November.
    11. Damania, R., 2001. "When the Weak Win: The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-22, July.
    12. Bommer, Rolf & Schulze, Günther G., 1994. "Economic integration and environmental policy: Does NAFTA increase pollution?," Discussion Papers, Series II 218, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    13. Barbier, Edward B. & Damania, Richard & Leonard, Daniel, 2005. "Corruption, trade and resource conversion," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 276-299, September.
    14. Anriquez, Gustavo, 2002. "Trade And The Environment: An Economic Literature Survey," Working Papers 28598, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    15. Rauscher, Michael, 2001. "International trade, foreign investment, and the environment," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 29, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    16. Russell Hillberry & Carlos Zurita, 2022. "Commitment behaviour in the World Trade Organization's Trade Facilitation Agreement," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 36-75, January.
    17. Per G. Fredriksson, 1999. "The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization and Environmental Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 513-525, January.
    18. Bommer, Rolf & Schulze, Gunther G., 1999. "Environmental improvement with trade liberalization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 639-661, November.
    19. Rauscher, Michael, 1995. "Protectionists, environmentalists, and the formation of environmental policy in an open economy," Kiel Working Papers 685, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    20. Sturm, Daniel & Ulph, Alistair, 2002. "Environment, trade, political economy and imperfect information: a survey," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 204, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mie:wpaper:283. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: FSPP Webmaster (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/riumius.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.