[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/luc/wpaper/17-16.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the impact of indirect competition for political influence on environmental policy

Author

Listed:
  • Fabien Prieur

    (Université Paris Nanterre)

  • Benteng Zou

    (CREA, Université du Luxembourg)

Abstract
Motivated by the history of climate politics in the US over the last decades, this paper aims at studying the impact of indirect competition for political influence, through environmental awareness raising vs disinformation campaigns, on environmental and economic performance. The analysis of the game in which groups devote efforts to bring the majority’s concern closer to their views shows a strong asymmetry in the results. Strategic interaction may lead the economy to a better situation in the long run, compared to what would prevail in the absence of lobbying. But this only occurs when the environmental group exhibits a radical ideology and people’s awareness is initially closer to that of the industrial group. By contrast, economies with very aggressive conservative groups and with people originally well aware of environmental problems can never benefit from the outcome of the game of political influence. The latter result is reinforced when one accounts for different lobbying powers and supremacy of industrial groups. This may explain why the US have failed to take action on global warming up to now.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2017. "On the impact of indirect competition for political influence on environmental policy," DEM Discussion Paper Series 17-16, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:17-16
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://wwwen-archive.uni.lu/content/download/102822/1230085/file/2017_16%20On%20the%20impact%20of%20indirect%20competition%20for%20political%20influence%20on%20environmental%20policy.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zhihao Yu, 2005. "Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(1), pages 269-286.
    2. Schumacher, Ingmar, 2015. "The endogenous formation of an environmental culture," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 200-221.
    3. Schumacher, Ingmar & Zou, Benteng, 2015. "Threshold preferences and the environment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 17-27.
    4. Lars H. Gulbrandsen & Steinar Andresen, 2004. "NGO Influence in the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms, and Sinks," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 4(4), pages 54-75, November.
    5. Aurora García‐Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzís, 2009. "Market Effects of Changes in Consumers' Social Responsibility," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 235-262, March.
    6. David P. Baron, 2003. "Private Politics," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 31-66, March.
    7. Geir Asheim, 2010. "Strategic Use of Environmental Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(2), pages 207-216, June.
    8. David P. Baron, 2001. "Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 7-45, March.
    9. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Thomas P. Lyon, 2016. "Merchants of Doubt: Corporate Political Influence when Expert Credibility is Uncertain," Working Papers 2016.28, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    10. Prieur, Fabien & Bréchet, Thierry, 2013. "Can Education Be Good For Both Growth And The Environment?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(5), pages 1135-1157, July.
    11. Baron, David P., 1994. "Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 33-47, March.
    12. Wirl, Franz, 1994. "The Dynamics of Lobbying--A Differential Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(3-4), pages 307-323, September.
    13. Julien Daubanes & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2019. "The Rise of NGO Activism," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 183-212, November.
    14. Georgy Egorov & Bård Harstad, 2017. "Private Politics and Public Regulation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1652-1682.
    15. Baron, David P., 2001. "Private Politics," Research Papers 1689, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    16. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying," AMSE Working Papers 1531, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jan 2018.
    2. Mireille Chiroleu‐Assouline & Thomas P. Lyon, 2020. "Merchants of doubt: Corporate political action when NGO credibility is uncertain," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 439-461, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Prieur, Fabien & Zou, Benteng, 2018. "Climate politics: How public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 63-72.
    2. Julien Daubanes & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2019. "The Rise of NGO Activism," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 183-212, November.
    3. Julien Daubanes & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2013. "Activists versus Captured Regulators," CESifo Working Paper Series 4444, CESifo.
    4. Schumacher, Ingmar & Zou, Benteng, 2015. "Threshold preferences and the environment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 17-27.
    5. Zijun Luo & Yonghong Zhou, 2020. "Decomposing the effects of consumer boycotts: evidence from the anti-Japanese demonstration in China," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(6), pages 2615-2634, June.
    6. Mattauch, Linus & Hepburn, Cameron, 2016. "Climate policy when preferences are endogenous – and sometimes they are," INET Oxford Working Papers 2016-04, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
    7. Schumacher, Ingmar, 2015. "The endogenous formation of an environmental culture," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 200-221.
    8. L. Lambertini & A. Palestini & A. Tampieri, 2014. "CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities," Working Papers wp959, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    9. Michele Fioretti & Victor Saint-Jean & Simon C. Smith, 2024. "NGO Activism: Exposure vs. Influence," Papers 2411.06875, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    10. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 240-260, Summer.
    11. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Private CSR Activities in Oligopolistic Markets: Is There Any Room for Regulation?," Working Papers 0816, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    12. Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2007. "Corporate Social Responsibility in Oligopoly," Working Papers 0707, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    13. Mattauch, Linus & Hepburn, Cameron & Stern, Nicholas, 2018. "Pigou pushes preferences: decarbonisation and endogenous values," INET Oxford Working Papers 2018-16, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
    14. Becchetti, Leonardo & Palestini, Arsen & Solferino, Nazaria & Elisabetta Tessitore, M., 2014. "The socially responsible choice in a duopolistic market: A dynamic model of “ethical product” differentiation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 114-123.
    15. repec:ipg:wpaper:13 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Francesca Colli & Johan Adriaensen, 2020. "Lobbying the state or the market? A framework to study civil society organizations’ strategic behavior," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(3), pages 501-513, July.
    17. Catherine Liston-Heyes & Gwen Ceton, 2009. "An Investigation of Real Versus Perceived CSP in S&P-500 Firms," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 89(2), pages 283-296, October.
    18. Markus Kitzmueller, 2008. "Economics and Corporate Social Responsibility," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/37, European University Institute.
    19. Giovanni Cespa & Giacinta Cestone, 2002. "Stakeholder Activism, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Congruence of Interests between Shareholders and Stakeholders," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 528.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    20. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying," AMSE Working Papers 1531, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jan 2018.
    21. Sylvia Maxfield, 2008. "Reconciling Corporate Citizenship and Competitive Strategy: Insights from Economic Theory," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 80(2), pages 367-377, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public persuasion; environmentalists; industrialists; environmental awareness; information campaigns; disinformation; game of political influence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:17-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marina Legrand (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/crcrplu.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.