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Wages, Supervision and Sharing

Author

Listed:
  • Sarah Brown
  • Fathi Fakhfakh
  • John G. Sessions
Abstract
Instrumental efficiency wage models predict an inverse relationship between wages and supervision with this relationship being more pronounced amongst firms participating in employee sharing. My theoretical exposition predicts that an increase in remuneration reduces monitoring more in "sharing" than in "non-sharing" firms. I explore these predictions using the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey. My empirical results confirm an inverse relationship between supervision and pay, but the trade-off is only heightened by performance-related pay and employee share ownership schemes. I find that employee share ownership and performance-related pay are more successful in alleviating the need to monitor.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Sarah Brown & Fathi Fakhfakh & John G. Sessions, "undated". "Wages, Supervision and Sharing," Discussion Papers in Public Sector Economics 00/4, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    • Handle: RePEc:lec:lpserc:00/4
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    File URL: https://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/lpserc/pserc00-4.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Göcke, 2011. "Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty," Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 57(2), pages 91-105.
    2. L. Monroy & V. Rubiales & A. M. Mármol, 2017. "The conservative Kalai–Smorodinsky solution for multiple scenario bargaining," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 251(1), pages 285-299, April.
    3. André Cieplinski, 2018. "Supervision and Work Content: Industry level evidence," Department of Economics University of Siena 776, Department of Economics, University of Siena.

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