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Do Security-differentiated Water Rights Improve Efficiency?

Author

Listed:
  • Marianne LEFEBVRE
  • Lata GANGADHARAN
  • Sophie THOYER
Abstract
Most existing water markets combine water rights trading and water allocation trading. Offering different levels of security for rights can make the market more sophisticated and allow water users to manage the risks of supply uncertainty better. We compare results from a laboratory experiment with two water right designs, one with a unique security level and another with two security levels. We find that a two security levels system improves both allocative eciency and risk management, but only when transactions costs are higher in the market for water allocation than in the market for water rights.

Suggested Citation

  • Marianne LEFEBVRE & Lata GANGADHARAN & Sophie THOYER, 2011. "Do Security-differentiated Water Rights Improve Efficiency?," Working Papers 11-14, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:11-14
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    File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2011-14.pdf
    File Function: Second version, 2012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Smith, Steven M., 2021. "The relative economic merits of alternative water right systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    3. Guerrero-Baena, M. Dolores & Villanueva, Anastasio J. & Gómez-Limón, José A. & Glenk, Klaus, 2019. "Willingness to pay for improved irrigation water supply reliability: An approach based on probability density functions," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 11-22.
    4. Philippe Bontems & Celine Nauges, 2018. "Production choices with water markets and risk aversion: the role of initial allocations and forward trading," Post-Print hal-02349932, HAL.
    5. Dietrich Earnhart & Nathan P. Hendricks, 2023. "Adapting to water restrictions: Intensive versus extensive adaptation over time differentiated by water right seniority," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(5), pages 1458-1490, October.
    6. Hassan, Wasim & Manzoor, Talha & Muhammad, Abubakr, 2023. "Improving equity in demand-driven irrigation systems through a rights-preserving water allocation mechanism," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 287(C).
    7. Zuo, Alec & Nauges, Celine & Wheeler, Sarah, 2012. "Water trading as a risk-management tool for farmers: new empirical evidence from the Australian water market," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 149885, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
    8. Kristiana Hansen & Jonathan Kaplan & Stephan Kroll, 2014. "Valuing Options in Water Markets: A Laboratory Investigation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 57(1), pages 59-80, January.

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