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Cooperation in International Banking Supervision

Author

Listed:
  • Cornelia Holthausen

    (European Central Bank)

  • Thomas Rønde

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract
This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision and regulation of a multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation and assume that supervisors maximize the welfare of their own country. The communication between the supervisors is modeled as a cheap talk game. We show that: (1) unless the interests of the countries are perfectly aligned, first best closure regulation cannot be implemented; (2) the more aligned the interests are, the higher is welfare; (3) the bank can allocate its investments strategically across countries to escape closure.

Suggested Citation

  • Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, 2003. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CIE Discussion Papers 2004-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:2004-02
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    multinational banks; supervision; closure; cheap talk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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