Informational Loss in Bundled Bargainings
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- Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2013. "Informational loss in bundled bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 338-362, July.
- Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan, 2012. "Informational Loss in Bundled Bargaining," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1234, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
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Cited by:
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Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
- Barton E. Lee, 2020. "Gridlock, leverage, and policy bundling," Discussion Papers 2020-09, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Ying Chen & Hülya Eraslan, 2017.
"Dynamic Agenda Setting,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 1-32, May.
- Ying Chen & Hulya Eraslan, 2015. "Dynamic Agenda Setting," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1517, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya, 2015. "Dynamic Agenda Setting," Working Papers 15-002, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Harstad, Bård, 2023.
"Pledge-and-review bargaining,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
- Bård Harstad, 2018. "Pledge-and-Review Bargaining," CESifo Working Paper Series 7296, CESifo.
- Vincent Anesi & Mikhail Safronov, 2023. "Deciding When To Decide: Collective Deliberation And Obstruction," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(2), pages 757-781, May.
- Piazolo, David & Vanberg, Christoph, 2022.
"Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule,"
Working Papers
0708, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Piazolo, David & Vanberg, Christoph, 2024. "Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule," Working Papers 0753, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Piazolo, David & Vanberg, Christoph, 2022. "Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule," Working Papers 0709, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Harstad, Bård, 2021. "A Theory of Pledge-and-Review Bargaining," Memorandum 5/2022, Oslo University, Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2021.
- Louis-Sidois, Charles & Musolff, Leon Andreas, 2024. "Buying voters with uncertain instrumental preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
- Alan E Wiseman, 2013. "Information and political institutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 301-308, July.
- Peter Bils & William Spaniel, 2017. "Policy bargaining and militarized conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 647-678, October.
- Chen, Ying & Zápal, Jan, 2022.
"Sequential vote buying,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
- Ying Chen & Jan Zapal, 2021. "Sequential Vote Buying," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp692, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Chen, Jidong, 2023. "Sequential agenda setting with strategic and informative voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2013-01-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-01-07 (Microeconomics)
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