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Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design

Author

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  • Schnedler, Wendelin

    (University of Paderborn)

Abstract
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an identification problem. It also describes organizations that can solve this identification problem and provides conditions under which such organisations exist. Applying the findings to established and new moral hazard models yields insights into optimal organization design, uncovers the reason why certain organization designs, such as advocacy or specialization, overcome restricted implementability, and formalizes a wide-spread type of multi-tasking problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Schnedler, Wendelin, 2010. "Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design," IZA Discussion Papers 5325, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5325
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    File URL: https://docs.iza.org/dp5325.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J. David, 2001. "An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199243273.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jenny Kragl & Anja Schöttner, 2014. "Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, And Optimal Job Design," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 525-550, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    identification by organization design; multi-tasking; implementation; hidden action; moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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