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Marriage, Divorce and Interstate Risk Sharing

Author

Listed:
  • Halla, Martin

    (WU Vienna University of Economics and Business)

  • Scharler, Johann

    (University of Innsbruck)

Abstract
In this paper we study the importance of marriage for interstate risk sharing. We find that US states in which married couples account for a higher share of the population are less exposed to state-specific output shocks. Thus, marriages do not just improve the allocation of risk at the individual level, but also have implications for the allocation of risk at the more aggregated state-level. Quantitatively, the impact of marriage on interstate risk sharing varies over divorce regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Halla, Martin & Scharler, Johann, 2008. "Marriage, Divorce and Interstate Risk Sharing," IZA Discussion Papers 3744, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3744
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Tammi, Timo, 2013. "Dictator game giving and norms of redistribution: Does giving in the dictator game parallel with the supporting of income redistribution in the field?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 44-48.
    3. Donni, Olivier, 2014. "Over-investment in marriage-specific capital," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 34-43.
    4. Mizuki Komura & Hikaru Ogawa, 2022. "COVID-19, marriage, and divorce in Japan," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 831-853, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    risk sharing; marriage; divorce; family law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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