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Assets, Attributes and Ownership

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  • Kirsten Foss
  • Nicolai J. Foss
Abstract
The notion of full asset ownership is important in economics, for example, in recent work on the boundaries of the firm, which has been taken up with the issue why it matters who owns an asset. However, recognizing that assets have multiple attributes, and that these may be subject to capture in world of positive measurement and enforcement costs, implies that the notion of full asset ownership is problematic. New property theorists sidestep these issues by implicitly assuming that residual rights of control are perfectly enforced (i.e., full asset ownership obtains). We discuss the notion of property rights and ownership in a positive enforcement and measurement cost setting, and suggest that the new property rights model is a part of a more overarching perspective, which also includes older contributions to property rights economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, "undated". "Assets, Attributes and Ownership," IVS/CBS Working Papers 00-3, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:ivs:iivswp:00-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard N. Langlois, 2002. "Modularity in Technology and Organization," Chapters, in: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein (ed.), Entrepreneurship and the Firm, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Foss Kirsten & Foss Nicolai & Klein Peter G. & Klein Sandra K., 2002. "Heterogeneous Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Organization," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-20, March.
    3. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, 2004. "The Next Step in the Evolution of the RBV: Integration with Transaction Cost Economics," management revue - Socio-Economic Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 15(1), pages 107-121.
    4. Carolina Andrea Gómez Winkler Sudré & José Paulo De Souza & Melise Dantas Machado Bouroullec, 2021. "Property rights and reputation in the dairy agro-industrial system," Post-Print hal-03671577, HAL.
    5. Jongeneel, Roelof A. & Polman, Nico B.P. & Slangen, Louis H.G., 2005. "Why Are Farmers Going Multifunctional?," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24585, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    6. Rossi, Enrico, 2020. "Reconsidering the dual nature of property rights: personal property and capital in the law and economics of property rights," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 105840, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Manyise, Timothy & Dentoni, Domenico, 2021. "Value chain partnerships and farmer entrepreneurship as balancing ecosystem services: Implications for agri-food systems resilience," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    8. Adwoa Asantewaa & Tooraj Jamasb & Manuel Llorca, 2022. "Electricity Sector Reform Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Parametric Distance Function Approach," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-29, March.
    9. Chaserant, Camille, 2007. "Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude : Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 83(2), pages 227-253, juin.
    10. Hinton, Jennifer B. & Cornell, Sarah E., 2022. "Profit as a means or an end? A conceptual framework for an ecological economics approach to sustainable business," Working Paper Series 03/2022, Post-Growth Economics Network (PEN).
    11. Frohwein, Torsten & Burr, Wolfgang, 2011. "Emerging issues in the further development of the resource-based view of the firm," Research Papers on Innovation, Services and Technology 1/2011, University of Stuttgart, Institute of Business Administration, Department I - Institute of Research & Development and Innovation Management.
    12. Geoffrey Hodgson, 2002. "The Legal Nature of the Firm and the Myth of the Firm-Market Hybrid," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 37-60.
    13. Jongeneel, Roelof A. & Slangen, Louis H.G., 2005. "Explaining the Changing Institutional Organisation of Dutch Farms: The Role of Farmer's Attitude, Advisory Network and Structural Factors," 94th Seminar, April 9-10, 2005, Ashford, UK 24441, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    14. Nicolai J. Foss, 2010. "Property Rights Economics," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Nicolai Foss, 2001. "Bounded Rationality in the Economics of Organization: Present Use and (Some) Future Possibilities," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 5(3), pages 401-425, September.
    16. Guilherme Fowler A. Monteiro & Bruno Varella Miranda, 2023. "Disentangling the role of the institutional environment in the ownership competence framework: A comment on Foss et al. (2021)," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(8), pages 1939-1954, August.
    17. Foss Nicolai J., 2004. "Cognition and Motivation in the Theory of the Firm: Interaction or "Never the Twain Shall Meet"?," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-24, March.
    18. Edward Gilmore & Ulf Andersson & Noushan Memar, . "How subsidiaries influence innovation in the MNE value chain," UNCTAD Transnational Corporations Journal, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
    19. Jongeneel, Roelof A. & Polman, Nico B.P. & Slangen, Louis H.G., 2005. "Explaining the Changing Institutional Organisation of Dutch Farms: The Role of Farmer's Attitude, Advisory Network and Structural Factors," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24526, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    20. Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein, 2005. "The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics A Stocktaking and Assessment," DRUID Working Papers 05-03, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    21. Richard N. Langlois, 2013. "The Austrian theory of the firm: Retrospect and prospect," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 247-258, September.
    22. Cristian Luise & Peter J. Buckley & Hinrich Voss & Emmanuella Plakoyiannaki & Elisa Barbieri, 2021. "The Role of Local Actors in the Implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative: the Example of the Italian Port System," Working Papers 07, Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    23. Foss, Nicolai J. & Klein, Peter G. & Kor, Yasemin Y. & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2006. "Entrepreneurship, Subjectivism, and the Resource-Based View: Towards a New Synthesis," Working Papers 06-0121, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    24. Nicolai Foss, 2002. "'Coase vs Hayek': Economic Organization and the Knowledge Economy," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 9-35.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ownership; property rights; economic organization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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