[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/isu/genstf/202106010700001814.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Pareto-improving transition to fully funded pensions under myopia

Author

Listed:
  • Andersen, Torben M.
  • Bhattacharya, Joydeep
  • Gestsson, Marias H.
Abstract
Under dynamic efficiency, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme helps the current generation of retirees but hurts future generations because they are forced to save via a return-dominated scheme. Abandoning it is deemed welfare-improving but typically not for all generations. But what if agents are present-biased (hence, undersave for retirement) and the “paternalistically motivated forced savings” component of a PAYG scheme motivated its existence in the first place? This paper shows it is possible to transition from such a PAYG scheme on to a higher return, mandated fully-funded scheme; yet, no generation is hurt in the process. The results inform the debate on policy design of pension systems as more and more policy makers push for the transition to take place but are forced to recognize that current retirees may get hurt along the way.

Suggested Citation

  • Andersen, Torben M. & Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Gestsson, Marias H., 2021. "Pareto-improving transition to fully funded pensions under myopia," ISU General Staff Papers 202106010700001814, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:202106010700001814
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/de516400-1347-4542-bc66-d41550829249/content
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Francesco Lancia & Alessia Russo, 2016. "Public Education and Pensions in Democracy: A Political Economy Theory," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(5), pages 1038-1073.
    2. Nicholas Barr & Peter Diamond, 2006. "The Economics of Pensions," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 22(1), pages 15-39, Spring.
    3. Brunner, Johann K., 1996. "Transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded pension system: The case of differing individuals and intragenerational fairness," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 131-146, April.
    4. Michele Boldrin & Ana Montes, 2005. "The Intergenerational State Education and Pensions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(3), pages 651-664.
    5. Martin Feldstein, 1995. "Would Privatizing Social Security Raise Economic Welfare?," NBER Working Papers 5281, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. David I. Laibson & Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, 1998. "Self-Control and Saving for Retirement," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1), pages 91-196.
    7. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 1996. "Privatization of Social Security: How It Works and Why It Matters," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 10, pages 1-32, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Bishnu, Monisankar & Wang, Min, 2017. "The political intergenerational welfare state," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 93-110.
    9. Homburg, Stefan, 1990. "The Efficiency of Unfunded Pension Schemes," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 146, pages 640-647.
    10. Torben Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2011. "On myopia as rationale for social security," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 135-158, May.
    11. Peter Diamond, 2004. "Social Security," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 1-24, March.
    12. Frassi, Benedetta & Gnecco, Giorgio & Pammolli, Fabio & Wen, Xue, 2019. "Intragenerational redistribution in a funded pension system," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 271-303, April.
    13. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2017. "The Intergenerational Welfare State and the Rise and Fall of Pay‐as‐you‐go Pensions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(602), pages 896-923, June.
    14. Hans Fehr & Christian Habermann, 2008. "Risk Sharing and Efficiency Implications of Progressive Pension Arrangements," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(2), pages 419-443, June.
    15. Martin Feldstein, 1985. "The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(2), pages 303-320.
    16. Wang, Mei & Rieger, Marc Oliver & Hens, Thorsten, 2016. "How time preferences differ: Evidence from 53 countries," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 115-135.
    17. Martin Feldstein & Andrew Samwick, 1997. "The Economics of Prefunding Social Security and Medicare Benefits," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, Volume 12, pages 115-164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Breyer, Friedrich & Straub, Martin, 1993. "Welfare effects of unfunded pension systems when labor supply is endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 77-91, January.
    19. Tatiana Damjanovic, 2006. "On The Possibility Of Pareto‐Improving Pension Reform," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 74(6), pages 711-724, December.
    20. Shinichi Nishiyama & Kent Smetters, 2007. "Does Social Security Privatization Produce Efficiency Gains?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1677-1719.
    21. Ono, Tetsuo & Uchida, Yuki, 2016. "Pensions, education, and growth: A positive analysis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 127-143.
    22. Raj Chetty & John N. Friedman & Søren Leth-Petersen & Torben Heien Nielsen & Tore Olsen, 2014. "Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(3), pages 1141-1219.
    23. Armin Falk & Anke Becker & Thomas Dohmen & Benjamin Enke & David B. Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2017. "Global Evidence on Economic Preferences," NBER Working Papers 23943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    24. Auerbach, Alan J & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1987. "Evaluating Fiscal Policy with a Dynamic Simulation Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 49-55, May.
    25. Atkinson, Anthony B., 1995. "The Welfare State and Economic Performance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(2), pages 171-98, June.
    26. Assar Lindbeck & Mats Persson, 2003. "The Gains from Pension Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 74-112, March.
    27. Dirk Krueger & Felix Kubler, 2006. "Pareto-Improving Social Security Reform when Financial Markets are Incomplete!?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 737-755, June.
    28. Ayşe İmrohoroğlu & Selahattin İmrohoroğlu & Douglas H. Joines, 2003. "Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Social Security," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(2), pages 745-784.
    29. Kumru, Cagri S. & Thanopoulos, Athanasios C., 2011. "Social security reform with self-control preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 886-899, August.
    30. Samuelson, Paul A, 1975. "Optimum Social Security in a Life-Cycle Growth Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(3), pages 539-544, October.
    31. Armin Falk & Anke Becker & Thomas Dohmen & Benjamin Enke & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2018. "Global Evidence on Economic Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(4), pages 1645-1692.
    32. Tanzi,Vito & Schuknecht,Ludger, 2000. "Public Spending in the 20th Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521662918, September.
    33. Raj Chetty, 2015. "Behavioral Economics and Public Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 1-33, May.
    34. Werding, Martin & Primorac, Marko, 2018. "Old-age provision in transition: the case of Croatia," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(4), pages 576-593, October.
    35. Peter Diamond & Nicholas Barr, 2006. "(UBS Pensions Series 041) The Economics of Pensions," FMG Discussion Papers dp563, Financial Markets Group.
    36. Bishnu, Monisankar & Garg, Shresth & Garg, Tishara & Ray, Tridip, 2021. "Optimal intergenerational transfers: Public education and pensions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    37. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2017. "The Intergenerational Welfare State and the Rise and Fall of Pay‐as‐you‐go Pensions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(602), pages 896-923, June.
    38. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Qing Liu, 2020. "Reference-Dependent Preferences, Time Inconsistency, and Unfunded Pensions," CESifo Working Paper Series 8260, CESifo.
    39. de la Croix,David & Michel,Philippe, 2002. "A Theory of Economic Growth," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521001151, September.
    40. Hans Fehr & Christian Habermann & Fabian Kindermann, 2008. "Social Security with Rational and Hyperbolic Consumers," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 884-903, October.
    41. A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Public Economics," Handbook of Public Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 4, number 4.
    42. Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 177-183, May.
    43. Richard C. Barnett & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Mikko Puhakka, 2018. "Private versus public old-age security," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 31(3), pages 703-746, July.
    44. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Stanley Fischer, 1989. "Lectures on Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262022834, April.
    45. Shinichi Nishiyama & Kent Smetters, 2005. "Consumption Taxes and Economic Efficiency with Idiosyncratic Wage Shocks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 1088-1115, October.
    46. Kaganovich, Michael & Zilcha, Itzhak, 2012. "Pay-as-you-go or funded social security? A general equilibrium comparison," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 455-467.
    47. Atkinson, Anthony B., 1995. "The Welfare State and Economic Performance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 48(2), pages 171-198, June.
    48. Frank Caliendo & Emin Gahramanov, 2013. "Myopia and pensions in general equilibrium," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 37(3), pages 375-401, July.
    49. A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Public Economics," Handbook of Public Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    50. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 1987. "Justifying Public Provision of Social Security," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(4), pages 674-696.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gustafsson, Johan, 2021. "Public Pension Reform and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-off," Umeå Economic Studies 992, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    2. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Qing Liu, 2023. "Can optimal unfunded public pensions co-exist with voluntary private retirement savings?," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 237-251, July.
    3. Amol Amol & Monisankar Bishnu & Tridip Ray, 2023. "Pension, possible phaseout, and endogenous fertility in general equilibrium," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(2), pages 376-406, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Amol Amol & Monisankar Bishnu & Tridip Ray, 2023. "Pension, possible phaseout, and endogenous fertility in general equilibrium," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(2), pages 376-406, April.
    2. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Qing Liu, 2021. "Reference‐dependent preferences, time inconsistency, and pay‐as‐you‐go pensions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1008-1030, July.
    3. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Qing Liu, 2020. "Reference-Dependent Preferences, Time Inconsistency, and Unfunded Pensions," CESifo Working Paper Series 8260, CESifo.
    4. Börsch-Supan, A. & Härtl, K. & Leite, D.N., 2016. "Social Security and Public Insurance," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 781-863, Elsevier.
    5. Bishnu, Monisankar & Garg, Shresth & Garg, Tishara & Ray, Tridip, 2021. "Optimal intergenerational transfers: Public education and pensions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    6. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2021. "Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 115-149, February.
    7. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Qing Liu, 2023. "Can optimal unfunded public pensions co-exist with voluntary private retirement savings?," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 237-251, July.
    8. Hans Fehr & Christian Habermann & Fabian Kindermann, 2008. "Social Security with Rational and Hyperbolic Consumers," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 884-903, October.
    9. Juan C. Conesa & Carlos Garriga, 2008. "Optimal Fiscal Policy In The Design Of Social Security Reforms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(1), pages 291-318, February.
    10. Hans Fehr, 2009. "Computable Stochastic Equilibrium Models and Their Use in Pension- and Ageing Research," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(4), pages 359-416, December.
    11. Hans Fehr & Fabian Kindermann, 2010. "Pension Funding and Individual Accounts in Economies with Life-cyclers and Myopes," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 56(3), pages 404-443, September.
    12. Koomen, Miriam & Wicht, Laurence, 2022. "Pension systems and the current account: An empirical exploration," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    13. Uchida, Yuki & Ono, Tetsuo, 2022. "Politics of Public Education and Pension Reform with Endogenous Fertility," MPRA Paper 112748, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Torben Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2020. "Intergenerational Debt Dynamics Without Tears," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 35, pages 192-219, January.
    15. Hans Fehr & Fabian Kindermann, 2010. "Pension Funding and Individual Accounts in Economies with Life-cyclers and Myopes," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 56(3), pages 404-443, September.
    16. Assar Lindbeck & Mats Persson, 2003. "The Gains from Pension Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 74-112, March.
    17. Torben Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2011. "On myopia as rationale for social security," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 135-158, May.
    18. Casamatta, G. & Batté, L., 2016. "The Political Economy of Population Aging," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 381-444, Elsevier.
    19. Joanna Tyrowicz & Krzysztof Makarski & Marcin Bielecki, 2016. "Reforming retirement age in DB and DC pension systems in an aging OLG economy with heterogenous agents," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 5(1), pages 1-36, December.
    20. Fehr, Hans, 2016. "CGE modeling social security reforms," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 475-494.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:202106010700001814. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Curtis Balmer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deiasus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.