[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iie/wpaper/wp16-6.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Benefits and Costs of Higher Capital Requirements for Banks

Author

Listed:
  • William R. Cline

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

Abstract
This study provides new estimates of the likely economic losses from banking crises. It also provides new estimates of the economic cost of increasing bank capital requirements, based on the author's earlier estimate (Cline 2015) of the empirical magnitude of the Modigliani-Miller effect in which higher capital reduces unit cost of equity capital. The study applies previous official estimates (BCBS 2010a) of the impact of higher capital on the probability of banking crises to derive a benefits curve for additional capital, which is highly nonlinear. The benefit and cost curves are examined to identify the socially optimal level of bank capital. This optimum is estimated at about 7 percent of total assets, with a more cautious alternative (75th percentile) at about 8 percent, corresponding to about 12 and 14 percent of riskweighted assets, respectively. These levels are, respectively, about one-fourth to one-half higher than the Basel III capital requirements for the large global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).

Suggested Citation

  • William R. Cline, 2016. "Benefits and Costs of Higher Capital Requirements for Banks," Working Paper Series WP16-6, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp16-6
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/benefits-and-costs-higher-capital-requirements-banks
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Avinash Persaud, 2014. "Why Bail-In Securities Are Fool's Gold," Policy Briefs PB14-23, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    2. Mr. Fabian Valencia & Mr. Luc Laeven, 2008. "Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database," IMF Working Papers 2008/224, International Monetary Fund.
    3. William R. Cline, 2015. "Testing the Modigliani-Miller Theorem of Capital Structure Irrelevance for Banks," Working Paper Series WP15-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    4. Iana Liadze & Ray Barrell & Professor E. Philip Davis, 2010. "The impact of global imbalances: Does the current account balance help to predict banking crises in OECD countries?," National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Discussion Papers 351, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    5. Jihad Dagher & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Luc Laeven & Lev Ratnovski & Hui Tong, 2016. "Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 16/04, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Blanchard, Oliver & Cerutti, Eugenio & SUmmers, Lawrence, 2015. "Inflation and Activity - Two Explorations and Their Monetary Policy Implications," Working Paper Series 15-070, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    7. Reinhart, Carmen M. & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 2013. "Banking crises: An equal opportunity menace," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4557-4573.
    8. Helmut Elsinger & Alfred Lehar & Martin Summer, 2006. "Using Market Information for Banking System Risk Assessment," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(1), March.
    9. William R. Cline, 2014. "Managing the Euro Area Debt Crisis," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 6871, April.
    10. Charles W. Calomiris, 2013. "Reforming Banks Without Destroying Their Productivity and Value," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 25(4), pages 14-20, December.
    11. Ryo Kato & Shun Kobayashi & Yumi Saita, 2010. "Calibrating the Level of Capital: The Way We See It," Bank of Japan Working Paper Series 10-E-6, Bank of Japan.
    12. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1995. "What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1421-1460, December.
    13. Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, 2013. "The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9929.
    14. Jihad Dagher & Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Mr. Luc Laeven & Mr. Lev Ratnovski & Mr. Hui Tong, 2016. "Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 2016/004, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thomas L. Hogan, 2021. "A Review of the Regulatory Impact Analysis of Risk-Based Capital and Related Liquidity Rules," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-29, January.
    2. Barth, James R. & Miller, Stephen Matteo, 2018. "Benefits and costs of a higher bank “leverage ratio”," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 37-52.
    3. Petr Jakubik & Bogdan Gabriel Moinescu, 2023. "What is the optimal capital ratio implying a stable European banking system?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 324-343, December.
    4. Junge, Georg & Kugler, Peter, 2017. "Optimal equity capital requirements for Swiss G-SIBs," Working papers 2017/11, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    5. Georg Junge & Peter Kugler, 2018. "Optimal equity capital requirements for large Swiss banks," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 154(1), pages 1-21, December.
    6. Ingo Fender & Ulf Lewrick, 2016. "Adding it all up: the macroeconomic impact of Basel II and outstanding reform issues," BIS Working Papers 591, Bank for International Settlements.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ambrocio, Gene & Hasan, Iftekhar & Jokivuolle, Esa & Ristolainen, Kim, 2020. "Are bank capital requirements optimally set? Evidence from researchers’ views," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    2. Georg Junge & Peter Kugler, 2018. "Optimal equity capital requirements for large Swiss banks," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 154(1), pages 1-21, December.
    3. Òscar Jordà & Björn Richter & Moritz Schularick & Alan M Taylor, 2021. "Bank Capital Redux: Solvency, Liquidity, and Crisis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(1), pages 260-286.
    4. Atasoy, Burak Sencer & Özkan, İbrahim & Erden, Lütfi, 2024. "The determinants of systemic risk contagion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    5. Martin Birn & Olivier de Bandt & Simon Firestone & Matías Gutiérrez Girault & Diana Hancock & Tord Krogh & Hitoshi Mio & Donald P. Morgan & Ajay Palvia & Valerio Scalone & Michael Straughan & Arzu Ulu, 2020. "The Costs and Benefits of Bank Capital—A Review of the Literature," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-25, April.
    6. Aikman, David & Haldane, Andrew & Hinterschweiger, Marc & Kapadia, Sujit, 2018. "Rethinking financial stability," Bank of England working papers 712, Bank of England.
    7. Ruud A. de Mooij & Mr. Michael Keen & Mr. Masanori Orihara, 2013. "Taxation, Bank Leverage, and Financial Crises," IMF Working Papers 2013/048, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Tente, Natalia & von Westernhagen, Natalja & Slopek, Ulf, 2017. "M-PRESS-CreditRisk: A holistic micro- and macroprudential approach to capital requirements," Discussion Papers 15/2017, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    9. Ambrocio, Gene & Hasan, Iftekhar & Jokivuolle, Esa & Ristolainen, Kim, 2020. "Are bank capital requirements optimally set? Evidence from researchers’ views," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    10. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2020_010 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Roumeen Islam, 2017. "Growth after Crisis in Europe: An Interdependence of Macroeconomic and Structural Policies," Cyprus Economic Policy Review, University of Cyprus, Economics Research Centre, vol. 11(2), pages 19-62, December.
    12. Luca, Oana & Tieman, Alexander F., 2019. "Financial sector debt bias," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-1.
    13. Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan & Elias Papaioannou & José-Luis Peydró, 2013. "Financial Regulation, Financial Globalization, and the Synchronization of Economic Activity," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(3), pages 1179-1228, June.
    14. Syed Abul Basher & Lawrence M. Kessler & Murat K. Munkin, 2017. "Bank capital and portfolio risk among Islamic banks," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(1), pages 1-9, September.
    15. Mikkel Hermansen & Oliver Röhn, 2017. "Economic resilience: The usefulness of early warning indicators in OECD countries," OECD Journal: Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2016(1), pages 9-35.
    16. Kirti, Divya, 2024. "When gambling for resurrection is too risky," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    17. Dominika Ehrenbergerová & Martin Hodula & Zuzana Gric, 2022. "Does capital-based regulation affect bank pricing policy?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 135-167, April.
    18. Michaela Posch & Stefan W. Schmitz & Peter Strobl, 2018. "Strengthening the euro area by addressing flawed incentives in the financial system," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue Q2/18, pages 34-50.
    19. Luca Agnello & Davide Furceri & Ricardo M. Sousa, 2011. "Fiscal Policy Discretion, Private Spending, and Crisis Episodes," NIPE Working Papers 31/2011, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    20. Le, Anh-Tuan & Tran, Thao Phuong & Mishra, Anil V., 2023. "Climate risk and bank stability: International evidence," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 70.
    21. David Glancy & Robert Kurtzman, 2022. "How Do Capital Requirements Affect Loan Rates? Evidence from High Volatility Commercial Real Estate," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 11(1), pages 88-127.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Regulation; Bank Capital Requirements; Capital Structure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp16-6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peterson Institute webmaster (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iieeeus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.