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From Private to Public Common Agency

Author

Listed:
  • Etienne Billette de Villemeur
  • Bruno Versaevel
Abstract
This note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common agency by Laussel and Le Breton (2001, J. Econ. Theory 100, 93-128) extend to a larger class of games, in which each principal’s gross monetary payoff does not depend exclusively on the quantities she receives. A new result is offered to demonstrate that Proposition 4.3 is robust to the introduction of negative externalities. An existing result is reinterpreted to show that Proposition 4.2 is robust to the introduction of positive externalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Bruno Versaevel, 2002. "From Private to Public Common Agency," Cahiers de recherche 02-06, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
    • Handle: RePEc:iea:carech:0206
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    2. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1996. "Complements and substitutes in common agency," Ricerche Economiche, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 325-345, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Versaevel Bruno & Vencatachellum Désiré, 2009. "R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-42, December.
    2. Michel Trommetter, 2010. "Flexibility in the implementation of intellectual property rights in agricultural biotechnology," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 223-245, December.
    3. Trommetter, M., 2008. "Intellectual property rights in agricultural and agro-food biotechnologies to 2030 (© OECD International Futures Programme)," Working Papers 200805, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    4. Chiesa, Gabriella & Denicolò, Vincenzo, 2009. "Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 296-311, January.
    5. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne & Versaevel, Bruno, 2019. "One lab, two firms, many possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 260-283.
    6. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    7. Versaevel Bruno & Vencatachellum Désiré, 2009. "R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-42, December.
    8. Versaevel, Bruno & de Villemeur, Étienne, 2003. "Conflict and Cooperation on R&D Markets," IDEI Working Papers 191, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    common agency; private; public; externalities.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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